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It’s OK to pay well, if you write well:  
The effects of remuneration disclosure readability  
  
Abstract  
We examine whether, and how, shareholders’ votes in the Say-on-Pay (SOP) 
are affected by the readability of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
(CD&A). Despite the SEC’s Plain English requirement, qualitative 
disclosures on executive remuneration are generally long and complex. 
Extant evidence on whether low readability results in higher or lower 
shareholder dissent in the SOP however is ambiguous. We resolve this debate 
by demonstrating that the effects of readability on SOP voting are 
heterogeneous; while obfuscation may reduce dissent when CEO 
compensation is close to ‘normal’ levels, diminished readability results in 
increased scepticism when pay levels are clearly excessive. The moderating 
role of readability is most pronounced for firms with less sophisticated 
shareholders, consistent with readability acting as a heuristic cue. Our results 
are robust to propensity score matching, and are less pronounced (1) when 
shareholders have less time to review the CD&A, and (2) when shareholders 
are distracted by competing AGMs, suggesting they are driven by readability, 
directly. Overall, our results highlight that greater use of Plain English in 
remuneration disclosures can have a substantial persuasive impact on 
shareholders.  
  
Keywords: Executive compensation, Say-on-Pay, Compensation Discussion 
and Analysis, Plain English, Readability.  










1.   Introduction 
Despite the SEC’s requirement that firms produce a Plain English report on executive 
remuneration, the typical Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) remains complex 
and un-engaging (Larcker et al., 2015). Accessible and informative disclosure in the CD&A is 
important as it serves as a basis for the Say-on-Pay (SOP) shareholder vote on executive 
remuneration. The SOP provides shareholders a voice on whether they approve the 
compensation of Named Executive Officers.1 With the aim of fostering shareholder 
engagement, the SEC encourages firms to produce a CD&A that clearly communicates the 
firm’s compensation story, and which “put[s] into perspective the numbers and narrative that 
follow it” (SEC, 2006, p. 29). Counter to this idea, however, Larcker et al.’s (2015) survey of 
institutional investors finds that only 38% consider the typical compensation disclosure to be 
clear and easy to understand.  
While very few prior studies in Accounting and Finance have examined the text of 
remuneration disclosures (El-Haj et al., 2019b), extant evidence suggests that poor readability 
has ambiguous effects on shareholder voting patterns in the SOP. For example, Hooghiemstra 
et al. (2017) find that diminished readability of the Directors Remuneration Report (DRR) can 
successfully obfuscate problematic CEO pay in the UK, thereby leading to lower SOP dissent, 
on average, in the face of excessive CEO pay. On the other hand, they find that low readability 
leads to increased dissent at firms with high institutional ownership, suggesting that low 
readability may, alternatively, increase scepticism regarding the appropriateness of pay 
arrangements in some cases. Lo et al. (2014) report evidence of a negative relationship between 
CD&A readability and SOP dissent, on average, for S&P 1500 firms, suggesting higher overall 
levels of scepticism accompany low readability in the US. Conversely, Balsam et al. (2016), 
                                                          
1 Named Executive Officers comprise the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and the next three 
most highly paid executives. 
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also using US data, do not find a significant relationship between CD&A readability and SOP 
dissent, overall.  
Our study contributes to this debate by demonstrating that the effect of readability on SOP 
dissent is contingent on the perceived degree of excessiveness in CEO pay. Intuitively, our 
results indicate that low readability leads shareholders to become increasingly sceptical of 
apparent CEO pay excesses, as the latter increases. The obfuscation effect of diminished 
readability in reducing SOP dissent, identified by Hooghiemstra et al. (2017), appears limited 
to cases where pay excesses are moderate, but gives-way to increased scepticism and higher 
SOP dissent when CEO pay is prima-facie more clearly excessive. 
The manner by which disclosure readability affects investors’ decision making has received 
increased attention in recent years. For example, it has been shown that readability affects the 
valuation judgments of equity-holders (Rennekamp, 2012; Hsieh et al., 2016; Hwang and Kim, 
2017), as well as the risk perceptions of debt-holders (Bosnall and Miller, 2017). The potential 
impact of corporate disclosure readability on shareholder monitoring and voting decisions (i.e., 
shareholder ‘voice’), however, remains largely unexplored. Arrangements for executive pay is 
a setting where there are incentives for managers to foster support from shareholders through 
strategic communication or symbolic action. For example, evidence from “just vote no’’ 
campaigns that preceded SOP suggests that mere public displays of shareholder dissatisfaction 
with pay arrangements can incentivise directors to take swift action to avoid embarrassment 
(Del Guercio et al., 2008), in some cases even ousting the reigning CEO (Ertimur et al., 2011). 
While the SOP in the U.S. is currently non-binding, high SOP dissent can lead to public 
shaming (Cai and Walkling, 2011) and enhanced external scrutiny (Ertimur et al., 2013). The 
SOP can therefore provide a catalyst for enhanced shareholder outreach and engagement. 
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It is generally accepted that low readability increases the costs to shareholders of collecting 
and processing information (Bloomfield, 2002). Since investors’ attention is a scarce resource 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), allocation of time and effort to processing information from 
corporate documents may be limited when these costs outweigh the benefits of being better 
informed. In the context of the SOP, retail investors,2 in particular, may consider that their vote 
is unlikely to be pivotal, and thus view only slight potential benefit from a thorough review of 
compensation arrangements. Accordingly, small shareholders appear disinclined to engage 
meaningfully with the SOP unless pay arrangements are clearly inappropriate, and tend not to 
vote ‘against’ in the SOP unless executive pay is highly excessive (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 
2016). It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that more complex CD&A may ‘put off’ 
shareholders from challenging executive pay arrangements, unless they prima-facie have a 
strong reason to believe that pay arrangements are problematic. 
Dissuading investors from extracting information may be desirable to managers when there is 
information that they would prefer to keep hidden (Courtis, 1998). From the preparers’ 
perspective, managers may therefore engage in obfuscation, for example by lowering 
disclosure readability, when there are incentives to conceal information from shareholders or 
other stakeholders, such as labour unions (Frantz et al., 2013). Managers’ intent may even be 
“to leave readers confused and to put them off probing further” (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 
2007, p. 12). Laksmana et al. (2012) find evidence of obfuscation when CD&A were first 
introduced, however they argue further that “heightened public scrutiny and regulatory 
oversight” (Laksmana et al., 2012, p. 201) resulted in the disappearance of this effect from as 
                                                          
2 Retail investors (i.e., non-institutional investors) are likely to own only a small portion of the firm, which renders 
many monitoring activities cost-ineffective (see Grossman and Hart, 1980; Strickland et al., 1996). They are also 
likely to be less-sophisticated compared with institutional (i.e., professional) investors. 
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early as the second year of the CD&A, suggesting deliberate obfuscation of the CD&A to be 
unsuccessful.  
In contrast to the obfuscation hypothesis, it is well documented in the Psychology literature 
that processing fluency (the ease with which information is gathered and processed) tends to 
positively affect perceptions of authors’ credibility (Rennekamp, 2012). A difficult to read 
CD&A may thus intensify shareholders’ suspicions that compensation arrangements are 
inappropriate, and that they cannot rely on the firm to act in their interest (Hwang and Kim, 
2017). The processing fluency heuristic has been shown to affect investors’ valuation 
decisions. For example, Rennekamp (2012) provides experimental evidence that investors 
weigh information more heavily within valuation judgments when presented in plainer English. 
Consistently, Hwang and Kim (2017) find that closed-end funds trade at a greater discount to 
their fundamental value when they produce less readable reports, and argue that the perceived 
value of delegated management is lower when they make disclosures that are difficult to read.  
The obfuscation and processing fluency effects of low disclosure readability are related, yet 
contradictory effects. Both obfuscation and processing fluency effects derive from the notion 
that low readability makes it more difficult for readers to extract the information content from 
disclosures. Yet, while the obfuscation hypothesis predicts that low readability makes 
shareholders less likely to challenge management, the processing fluency hypothesis suggests 
that low readability increases suspicion, and therefore shareholders will be more likely to 
challenge management as a result. We attempt to disentangle these effects by arguing that 
readability effects are likely to be heterogeneous, and depend on whether shareholders prima-
facie consider executive pay levels to be problematic, and have therefore a more pressing need 
for adequate justification. Specifically, we expect the obfuscation effect of low readability in 
reducing SOP dissent is more likely to dominate when CEO pay otherwise appears in-line with 
benchmarks. When CEO pay is clearly excessive (e.g., well above the sector), shareholders’ 
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default position is to challenge management, unless the CD&A tells a convincing 
‘compensation story’ – i.e., low readability hinders shareholders discovery of an adequate 
justification. 
We isolate CD&A text from 2,686 proxy statements of S&P 1500 firms holding a SOP vote on 
compensation awarded between fiscal years 2010 and 2014, and measure readability using the 
Bog Index (following Bonsall et al., 2017), as well as the Gunning-Fog Index. We observe that 
the readability of the typical CD&A is very low; on average, Bog is estimated at 96.5, which 
indicates ‘poor’ readability according to the index; we estimate Fog to be 23.6 on average, 
which suggests that 23.6 years of formal education are required in order to be able to 
comprehend the typical CD&A on first reading. Our main results indicate that CD&A 
readability plays a significant moderating role on the link between CEO excess compensation 
(Excess comp) and SOP dissent, consistent with the processing fluency effect of low readability 
dominating over the obfuscation effect at high levels of Excess comp. Specifically, we find that 
the conditional incremental probability of receiving a high level of dissent (>30% votes cast 
‘against’) given Excess comp, is significantly higher for firms with a High Bog or High Fog 
CD&A (greater than median Bog or Fog). The economic significance of this result appears 
substantial. We estimate the probability of high dissent for a firm with Excess comp of two 
standard deviations above the mean to be 27.5% when CD&A Bog is high, compared to 17.8% 
when low; and 33.9% (13.8%) when Fog is high (low). We also find the results are more 
pronounced for firms with low institutional ownership which is consistent with heuristic 
processing. 
Given that our results may alternatively be driven by underlying agency problems resulting in 
both higher Excess comp and lower CD&A readability, we conduct propensity score matching 
based on the probability of poor readability and find our results to be robust. Since our 
hypotheses are based on the presumption that shareholders have sufficient time to thoroughly 
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review the CD&A, we also conduct further sensitivity tests based on the notion that 
shareholders’ attention is often constrained (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). We report that the 
readability effect weakens when (i) short notice is given between publication of the CD&A and 
the AGM, and (ii) when a high number of other AGMs occur at the same time. Since 
shareholders are less likely to have time to review each CD&A in these cases, this adds further 
support to the effect being driven by readability, directly.  
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to examine whether remuneration report 
readability affects shareholders’ participation in the SOP (as opposed to the level of dissent). 
This is important as it speaks directly to the underlying intention for the Plain English 
requirement, that is, to increase engagement by unsophisticated investors. To this end, our 
results highlight lower engagement by non-institutional shareholders in the SOP, and that this 
is unaffected by variations in CD&A readability and excess CEO compensation. We do, 
however, corroborate the views from Larcker et al.’s (2015) survey that CD&A are, in general, 
written in highly complex language, and thus conjecture that preconceptions regarding the 
general complexity of CD&A and compensation arrangements may be putting off some 
shareholders from engaging with the disclosures and the SOP altogether.  
Finally, we examine the robustness of our findings when incorporating the role of media 
coverage, on the basis that negative media coverage of executive pay may co-occur with both 
SOP dissent (Hooghiemstra et al., 2015) and low CD&A readability. We find that firms with 
more excessive CEO compensation are more likely to attract negative media coverage, 
however we observe the effects of CD&A readability on SOP votes to be distinct from that of 
negative media reports. 
Our paper contributes to growing empirical literature on the readability of compensation 
disclosures by demonstrating that the effects of readability on SOP voting are, in fact, 
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heterogeneous, and depend on the degree of pay excesses. While Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) 
provide evidence that poor readability reduces SOP dissent, we demonstrate that this 
obfuscation effect appears limited to cases where executive pay is close to ‘normal’ levels. 
Instead, when CEO pay is prima facie more clearly excessive, lower perceptions of 
management credibility from poor CD&A readability result in higher SOP dissent. Though 
Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) find some evidence of low readability increasing dissent for firms 
with particularly high levels of institutional ownership (IO), we demonstrate that, when 
accounting for the moderating effect of readability on Excess comp, this effect is also (and, in 
fact most) manifest for low IO firms. Our findings therefore resolve the otherwise seeming 
contradiction that a heuristic processing effect (i.e., processing fluency) would be exhibited by 
more sophisticated investors, rather than investor bases that are more likely to be 
unsophisticated.  
Our paper is also the first to provide evidence of the processing fluency effects of readability 
within the context of the US SOP, where the use of Plain English in CD&A is actively 
encouraged by the SEC. Our findings are of practical relevance as they demonstrate that a clear 
and understandable compensation story is key to successfully justifying high executive pay. 
Conversely, from both a theoretical and regulatory perspective, our results also emphasise the 
possibility that firms could make strategic communication choices (i.e., enhancing the 
presentation of the CD&A) to inflate SOP support. 
We also contribute more generally to the literature on readability of corporate narrative 
disclosures. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to demonstrate heterogeneity in the effects 
of readability when accounting for investors’ prior concerns, e.g., apparent pay excesses in our 
setting. This suggests an important priming role of trust in conditioning the effect of readability 
on perceptions formed when reviewing disclosures. Further exploration of conditionality in 
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shareholders’ responses to other disclosures (e.g., earnings announcements, periodic reports) 
according to, e.g., indicators of agency concerns may be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional setting 
for the SOP and related compensation disclosure within the US context, and presents the 
development of our hypotheses. The sample data and construction of our main variables is 
described in Section 3. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2.   Background, Prior Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Setting 
Although requirements for enhanced compensation disclosure within the annual proxy 
statement preceded Say-on-Pay (SOP) by several years, and advisory SOP votes were held by 
certain US corporations prior to 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) mandated that all large 
public US corporations hold a non-binding shareholder vote from the 2011 proxy season 
onwards, and at least once every three years. Section 14A of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires 
companies to allow shareholders to vote on the frequency of the SOP, and Ernst and Young 
(2018) report that 90% of Russell 3000 companies now provide for an annual vote. 
To inform the SOP, the SEC requires a CD&A section to be included in the DEF 14A proxy 
statement, and that it be written in Plain English.3 The CD&A is published after the end of the 
fiscal year to which the SOP relates, typically 30 to 45 days before the AGM during which the 
vote will be held. The SEC (2006, p. 191-192) suggest that “clearer, more concise presentation 
of executive and director compensation matters… can facilitate more informed investing and 
                                                          
3 The SEC (2006, p. 192) advocate, for example, the use of “short sentences”, and “definite, concrete, everyday 
words”, consistently with our use of the Gunning-Fog Index to measure readability, which considers readability 
to be inversely related with average sentence length and the proportion of complex words. 
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voting decisions in the face of complex information”. The SOP has thus been viewed as a 
catalyst for shareholder engagement and dialogue, with failures in “shareholder outreach and 
disclosure” noted by Semler Brossy (2016, p. 5) as a common contributory factor in cases of 
high SOP dissent.  
Although the SEC’s Plain English initiative was primarily intended to benefit the “least 
sophisticated investors” (SEC, 1998), the previous SEC Chairperson, Christopher Cox 
reflected that “the average Compensation Disclosure and Analysis section isn't anywhere close 
to Plain English”, suggesting that “most of it is as tough to read as a Ph.D. dissertation” (Cox, 
2007). Larcker et al. (2015) also found only 38% of institutional investors surveyed consider 
the typical compensation disclosure in the proxy statement to be clear and easy to understand.  
Whilst the SOP vote is non-binding, levels of dissent of above 25%-30% have been found to 
place pressure on boards to address shareholder concerns.4 Ertimur et al. (2013) find that 32% 
of firms receiving just under 30% SOP dissent instil compensation changes, but that this 
increases discontinuously to 72% for firms receiving just over 30% dissent. Relatively few 
firms (approx. 10%) receive SOP dissent of 30% or more, however, and in the majority of cases 
dissent is below 10% (Brunarski et al., 2015). The academic literature typically considers 
‘high’ dissent as anything over 30% (e.g., Brunarski et al., 2015) or in some cases 20% (Correa 
and Lel, 2016).  
Hooghiemstra et al. (2017), amongst others, provide useful insights regarding the UK context 
but the setting of the US SOP differs in several important respects. Firstly, while UK 
remuneration disclosures are written by the board of directors, responsibility for the CD&A 
lies with senior executives. As it is also senior executives’ remuneration that the US SOP 
                                                          
4 The two largest proxy advisory services, Glass Lewis and ISS, have policies to place increased levels of scrutiny 
on firms receiving greater than 25% and 30% dissent, respectively. 
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relates to, potential agency problems, specifically incentives to produce more persuasive 
remuneration disclosures, are arguably heightened in the US context. Secondly, broker voting 
of shares held in street name has been disallowed in the US since the inception of the SOP but 
is permitted in the UK. This is important as brokers tend to cast votes disproportionately in 
favour of management (Bethel & Gillan, 2002; Cai et al., 2017). Thirdly, CD&A of US firms 
are typically longer and more complex than DRR. For example, the average (median) length 
of US CD&A in our sample is 6,814 (6,830) words. Data compiled by the Corporate Financial 
Information Environment project (El-Haj et al., 2019a) indicates that the average (median) 
length of UK DRR over the same period was 3,998 (2,513) words.5 
 
2.2 Writing the CD&A – The Preparers’ Perspective 
Whilst our main focus is on the users’ perspectives, i.e., whether readability affects investors’ 
judgements, it is important to also consider the preparer’s perspective, since CD&A may be 
prepared strategically, to increase shareholder approval.  
There is some evidence that managers exploit investors’ limited ability to process information 
by strategically reducing readability in order to obfuscate bad news. For instance, Li (2008) 
finds evidence that companies use strategic obfuscation in their annual reports to hide poor 
results. Warren Buffett comments, in the preface to the SEC’s (1998, p. 1) Plain English 
Handbook, “In some cases,… I suspect that a less-than-scrupulous issuer doesn’t want us to 
understand a subject it feels legally obligated to touch upon”. Laksmana et al. (2012) reports 
evidence of obfuscation of CEO pay when CD&As were first introduced and Robinson et al. 
                                                          
5 While the firms in our sample are likely to be, on the whole, larger than the average UK firm, this is unlikely to 
explain the pronounced disparity in typical remuneration disclosure length. All else equal, we observe each 
additional $1bn of sales to be associated with CD&A that are approximately 8 words longer on average. Mean 
(median) sales in our sample is $12bn ($3bn) implying an approximate 96 (24) word increment in typical word-
count, over the very smallest firms. Moreover, the mean (median) word length of UK DRR situates just above 
(below) the 10th percentile of our US CD&A sample. 
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(2011) document that non-compliance in the first wave of CD&A, as identified by SEC 
critiques, was positively associated with excess CEO compensation.6 Hooghiemstra et al. 
(2017) also provide evidence of obfuscation in UK Directors’ Remuneration Reports (DRR). 
Bloomfield (2008) intuitively suggests that readability is also affected by ‘ontology’ (i.e., the 
nature of subject matter). Firms may therefore naturally default to highly technical language if 
the effort required to write in Plain English is not considered worthwhile. Bushee and Miller 
(2012) report that smaller, less visible firms, in particular, prefer to develop direct channels of 
communications with target investor groups rather than improve disclosure. Improved 
disclosure may even induce a more volatile stock price by attracting transient investors (Bushee 
and Noe, 2000), an outcome which some companies may be keen to avoid. 
2.3 Effects of CD&A Readability – The Users’ Perspective 
A substantial part of an investor’s information set regarding the executive compensation 
package is conveyed through narrative disclosure within the CD&A. Since investors’ attention 
is a scarce resource (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), the costs of collecting information from the 
typical CD&A are likely to be high. Considerable time and effort is required to process and 
interpret complex communication (Lehavy et al., 2011). Bloomfield (2002) postulates that 
investors’ judgments are less informed when information collection costs are high since 
collection costs can outweigh the perceived benefits. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Lehavy et al. (2011) find less readable 10-K reports are 
associated with greater dispersion and lower accuracy in analyst forecasts, suggesting even 
                                                          
6 CD&A readability may be affected by the risk of litigation, if increased involvement of legal council in drafting 
compensation disclosure leads to a greater prevalence of boilerplate language (Serafin, 1998). The second SOP 
proxy season (2012), in particular, saw significant numbers of lawsuits related to proxy compensation disclosures 
(Ross, 2013). Evidence suggests that stronger legal compliance of disclosures can mitigate litigation risk (Hanley 
and Hoberg, 2012).  
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sophisticated audiences are less informed when readability is poor.7 Lawrence (2013) argues 
that difficult-to-read disclosures may place retail investors, in particular, at an informational 
disadvantage and suggests individual investors invest less in firms with lower quality 
disclosures.  
Rather than less-readable remuneration disclosures not affecting voting outcomes, 
Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) find that obfuscation, due to lower readability, results in lower SOP 
dissent. Poor readability may leave shareholders confused, and less able to form unambiguous 
conclusions on the appropriateness of CEO pay. In the absence of clear reasoning to believe 
that pay arrangements are inappropriate, shareholders left confused may simply revert to a 
‘default’ position of endorsing the pay arrangements. In other words, shareholders may be less 
likely to challenge pay arrangements if they do not fully understand the content of the CD&A 
(Hooghiemstra et al., 2017). We therefore state our first hypothesis, in its alternative form and 
according to the obfuscation hypothesis, as follows: 
H1    Lower CD&A readability decreases the probability of dissent in the absence of clear 
excesses in CEO pay.  
A seemingly contradictory perspective to the obfuscation hypothesis is that shareholders may 
become more sceptical, rather than dismissive, of pay arrangements as a result of poor 
readability. Rennekamp (2012), amongst others, suggest investors find disclosures that are 
more difficult to process to be less credible and suggest processing fluency (high readability) 
can, subconsciously, improve confidence in the message conveyed. Hwang and Kim (2017, p. 
374) conjecture that “lower readability undermines investors’ belief that a source can be 
trusted”. Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) also suggest processing fluency increases individuals’ 
                                                          
7 Moreover, while the market typically under-reacts to 10-K filings, according to You and Zhang (2009), this is 
even more so for longer reports. Similarly, Lee (2012) finds that under-reaction to earnings announcements (the 




reliance on information (such as management’s justification of executive pay arrangements in 
the CD&A) when making decisions. Rennekamp (2012) further argues that, even when the 
same information is being conveyed, investors evaluate the credibility of management to be 
lower when processing fluency (readability) is poor. The processing fluency hypothesis would 
therefore predict that shareholders are more likely to consider excessive CEO pay to be 
unjustified when the CD&A is less readable. 
As previously mentioned, SOP outcomes are particularly sensitive to excesses in CEO 
compensation levels. Low pay-performance sensitivity, i.e. proposed pay levels that are 
unwarranted given corporate and/or stock performance, can be a significant predictor of SOP 
dissent (Collins et al., 2019). It is implausible that shareholders would vote ‘against’ when 
CEO pay is substantially below the benchmark (i.e., when the CEO is underpaid) purely based 
on a difficult to read CD&A. On the other hand, we expect that scepticism of pay arrangements 
is likely to be heightened when CEO pay is highly excessive. For example, Stathopoulos and 
Voulgaris (2016) demonstrate that less-engaged shareholders refrain from casting a negative 
vote unless CEO pay is clearly excessive. We therefore conjecture that while shareholders’ 
default position may be to endorse pay arrangements when CEO pay is at normal levels, the 
default is more likely to be to challenge pay arrangements when CEO pay prima-facie appears 
highly excessive (e.g., is well above benchmarks).  
Shareholders will perceive a more pressing need for justification when CEO pay appears highly 
excessive, and therefore a clear understanding of the rationale for pay arrangements (facilitated 
through greater Plain English) would be pivotal in quelling their concerns. Thus, while 
obfuscation may be successful when excess pay is at moderate levels, we expect that 
shareholders will become more (not less) sceptical of pay arrangements as a result of low 
CD&A readability, when CEO pay is clearly excessive. Specifically, we conjecture that CD&A 
readability moderates the effect of Excess comp on Dissent, such that less readable CD&A 
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undermine shareholders’ perceptions of management credibility, and tolerance of excessive 
pay, when compensation levels are clearly high. Low CD&A readability is thereby predicted 
to strengthen the impact of Excess comp on the probability of Dissent.8 We therefore state our 
second hypothesis, based on the processing fluency hypothesis, as follows: 
H2   Lower CD&A readability increases (positively moderates) the conditional 
probability of dissent given the extent of excess CEO pay.  
2.4 The Presence of Institutional Shareholders 
Engagement in monitoring activities varies depending on the incremental benefits and costs 
faced by each investor (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016). The collection of information from 
corporate documents is costly in terms of time and effort (Bloomfield, 2002), thus anticipation 
of greater derived benefits from a thorough review of the CD&A is necessary to render the 
effort worthwhile. Consistent with this, prior literature demonstrates that the intensity of 
monitoring is greater when ownership is characterised by large institutional shareholders who 
are able to benefit from economies of scale and hence face lower proportional information 
collection costs (Chen et al., 2007). Sophisticated investors (e.g., institutional investors) may 
also have a comparative advantage, since, according to Bushman et al. (1996, p. 52), 
unsophisticated investors are more likely to suffer from “information overload”. 
There is evidence that large institutional investors actively engage in effective monitoring of 
executive pay. For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity is positively related to institutional ownership concentration, while Khan et al. 
(2005) observe that a greater proportion of equity held by the largest institutional investor is 
                                                          
8 Heterogeneous effects of CD&A readability on Dissent may explain why Lo et al. (2014) report evidence of a 
negative relationship between CD&A readability and SOP dissent, Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) provide evidence 
of a positive relationship, while Balsam et al. (2016) find no significant effect. These prior studies do not consider 
any moderating effect of readability on the link between Excess comp and Dissent.  
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associated with more moderate CEO pay.9 On the other hand, Stathopoulos and Voulgaris 
(2016) observe that short-term oriented institutional investors, who face lower monitoring 
incentives, are more likely to avoid expressing opinion by abstaining from the SOP altogether. 
Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) also find that lower DRR readability is associated with greater 
levels of SOP dissent for firms with high levels of institutional ownership. 
For small investors, the anticipated costs of processing the CD&A may outweigh the perceived 
benefits altogether, hence they may choose to ignore the CD&A, in which case, variations in 
CD&A readability would have little impact on SOP voting patterns. Thus, the impact of 
readability on the SOP may be stronger for companies with greater levels of institutional 
ownership, i.e., when monitoring intensity, and thus incentives for engagement with the 
CD&A, are high. 
Conversely, according to Tan et al. (2014), variations in CD&A readability may have a greater 
impact on small shareholders, providing they engage with the disclosure, as they are more 
likely to be influenced by heuristic processing such as the processing fluency heuristic. Large 
institutional investors, however, are more likely to engage in systematic information 
processing, rather than heuristic processing, due to greater monitoring incentives as well as a 
greater level of sophistication. This suggests that institutional investors’ judgements will be 
less influenced by variations in CD&A readability. While we discuss above that the effects of 
CD&A readability on small shareholder voting (e.g. the processing fluency heuristic) are 
conditional on small shareholders engaging fully with the SOP, potentially unfair executive 
remuneration is a topic which attracts considerable capital market and public outrage, and 
investment professionals often have relatively higher outrage thresholds (Arnold & Grasser, 
                                                          
9 Evidence from the securities lending market also suggests that large institutional investors value their ability to 
express voice through voting, restricting lendable supply and even recalling loaned shares prior to proxy record 
dates (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Such reductions in equity lending are found to be greater for firms with high 
concentrations of institutional investors.  
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2018). Thus, there are strong reasons to expect that even small shareholders will engage with 
the process, and we therefore state our third hypothesis as follows: 
H3    The effect of CD&A readability on the conditional probability of dissent, given 
the level of excess compensation, is greater for firms with low institutional 
ownership. 
3.   Data and Key Variables 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We construct our sample from the population of S&P 1500 firms holding a shareholder SOP 
vote for fiscal years 2010 to 2014.10 We collect DEF 14A proxy statements from the SEC 
EDGAR database and isolate the CD&A following the parsing procedure outlined in Appendix 
B. We obtain SOP voting results from Bloomberg,11 as well as CEO-level data. Firm-level 
financial data are from Worldscope, and returns data are from Datastream.12 Our final sample 
consists of 2,686 firm-year observations with all necessary data available. Of these, there are 
219 instances of firms receiving greater than 30% dissent, or 8.15% of the full sample. This 
compares very closely to frequencies of >30% dissent for S&P 1500 firms observed by Ertimur 
                                                          
10 We retain financial firms in the sample alongside non-financial firms, as controversy regarding executive 
compensation is equally manifest in this sector. We observe no significant differences in the results between 
financial and non-financial firms. 
11 We check the integrity of the voting data by also hand-collecting results from 1,000 Form 8-K filings. We 
observe an agreement rate of 98.8% with voting data obtained from Bloomberg. 
12 We use accounting data from the Worldscope database as Ulbricht and Weiner (2005) find no statistical or 
methodological shortcomings in comparison with Compustat for US firms. They also report that since 1998 a 
greater coverage of firms is provided by Worldscope, though as we focus on S&P 1500 firms any difference in 
coverage is likely to be minimal. Overall, they conclude that use of both databases should lead to comparable 
results. While some papers suggest greater caution should be used when using returns data from Datastream as 
opposed to CRSP (Ince & Porter, 2006), Schmidt et al. (2019) find that aggregate market returns and risk factors 
calculated using Datastream data compare very closely to those derived from CRSP. Ince and Porter (2006) 
identify potential security-level issues in Datastream, however, including incorrect identification of the exchange 
of listing. As they state that most of the problems are concentrated in smaller stocks and/or low-price stocks, we 
do not expect our analyses of S&P 1500 firms to be significantly affected by our database choices. As we employ 
yearly returns, potential short-term biases are likely to be smoothed-out. Similar to prior papers, we also winsorise 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate any remaining issues. A number of prior studies choose to employ 
Datastream for U.S. returns data due to the breadth and depth of its coverage (Hou et al. 2011). 
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et al. (2013) and Brunarski et al. (2015) of 8.2% and 8.88%, respectively. For further tests, we 
supplement our dataset with institutional ownership data from Thomson One Banker. We 
obtain ownership data for 2,141 firm-years (173 of which have greater than 30% dissent). We 
employ the full sample of 2,686 observation in tests that do not require institutional 
shareholdings data. 
3.2 Estimating Excess CEO Compensation 
We estimate a baseline measure of excess CEO compensation (Excess comp) following Core 
et al. (2008), since SOP outcomes are shown to be particularly sensitive to the excessiveness 
of CEO compensation (Brunarski et al., 2015). We focus on excesses in terms of total CEO 
compensation (Total comp), being the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan pay-outs, 
the value of restricted stock grants, the value of options granted during the year, and any other 
annual pay; as reported in the summary compensation table of the DEF 14A. Excess comp is 
estimated as the residuals from cross-sectional regressions of ln(Total comp) on a range of 
firm-specific variables. That is, Excess comp is equal to ln(Total comp) minus its fitted value 
(the ‘expected’ level of pay). Specifically, we run rolling OLS regressions predicting Excess 
comp in year t using observations from years t-2 to t, taking the following form: 
ln(Total compi,t) = α + β1 ln(tenurei,t) + β2 ln(salesi,t) + β3S&P500i,t
                       + β4 Bk Mkt⁄ i,t + β5ROAi.t + β6ROAi.t−1 + β7RETi.t + β8RETi.t−1
+ γ. year + δ. industry + εi,t                                             
(1) 
Where tenure is CEO tenure at the year-end in years; sales is firm sales at the end of year t; 
S&P500 is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm is a constituent of the S&P 500, and 0 otherwise; 
Bk/Mkt is the book-to-market ratio calculated as (book value of assets)/(book value of liabilities 
+ market value of equity); ROA is return on assets (operating income scaled by total assets); 
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and RET is the stock return over the 12 months to the year-end.13 We also include year and 
industry fixed effects, based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. Year t is the fiscal 
year for which Total comp is awarded (the year the SOP vote relates to, as opposed to the year 
in which the vote takes place).  
Excess comp, in year t, is taken as the residual from Eq. (1), which orthogonalizes CEO pay to 
cross-sectional predictors during years t-2 to t. Cumulatively, our regressions therefore include 
data for S&P 1500 firm-years from 2008 to 2014. While Core et al. (2008) model expected 
compensation using annual cross-sectional regressions, Brunarski et al. (2015) run a single 
pooled regression employing four years’ data. Though we estimate Excess comp using three-
year rolling regressions, for brevity we present estimates for the full 2008-2014 period in Table 
1. Similar to Core et al. (2008), we find that ln(Total comp) is significantly higher for CEOs of 
larger firms, S&P500 constituents, and firms realising higher stock returns over the last two 
years, but is unrelated to ln(tenure). Our results somewhat differ from Core et al. (2008), 
however, as CEO pay does not appear to be negatively related to Bk/Mkt or ROA for either of 
the prior two years. We find firm size, measured by the log of sales, to be the most significant 
predictor of CEO compensation levels. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.3 CD&A Readability 
We focus on the readability of the CD&A section of the proxy statement, specifically, since: 
1. DEF 14A text outside of this section mostly relates to matters other than executive 
remuneration; 
                                                          
13 We also include ln(Total assets) instead of ln(Sales) in Eq. (1) and obtain consistent results. 
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2. Remuneration disclosures outside of the CD&A mainly consist of tables and technical 
notes which are not amenable to text analysis; and  
3. The purpose of the CD&A is to “plainly tell the company’s compensation story” (Cox, 
2007). As such, the SEC specifically require the CD&A to be written in Plain English. 
Our primary measure of CD&A readability is the Bog Index, as suggested by Bonsall et al. 
(2017). The Bog Index is a readability measure provided by the computational linguistics 
software, StyleWriter – The Plain English Editor. The main advantage of the Bog Index, as a 
measure of CD&A readability, over alternative measures, is that it is based on a range of Plain 
English attributes recommended in the SEC’s (1998) Plain English Handbook. The Bog Index 
is calculated as the sum of three broad components: (1) Sentence Bog; (2) Pep; and (3) Word 
Bog. Sentence Bog reflects the diminution of readability from longer sentences, in a non-linear 
fashion (it is based on the squared average sentence length). Pep reflects attributes that facilitate 
readability, by making the writing more interesting (e.g., use of names and interesting words). 
Finally, Word Bog reflects a range of word-level attributes which affect readability either due 
to (1) Plain English style problems (e.g., passive verbs, legal terms, clichés, etc.), and/or (2) 
word difficulty (based on a proprietary dictionary). 
The Bog Index is an inverse measure of readability, with high Bog Index values reflecting low 
readability, or a low level of Plain English. The StyleWriter software defines the readability of 
texts with Bog Index values above 70 as ‘poor’, above 100 as ‘bad’, and above 130 as 
‘dreadful’. We estimate the Bog of CD&As in our sample to have a mean of 96.5 (median = 
96), with a range between 60 and 177, thus indicating the average readability of CD&A 
disclosures in our sample to be ‘poor’, and a significant portion (31.2%) are defined as either 
‘bad’ or ‘dreadful’. 
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We also estimate the readability of the CD&A using the Gunning-Fog Index (Fog).14 The Fog 
Index measures textual complexity as a function of (a) the number of words per sentence, and 
(b) the percentage of words identified as ‘complex’. Complex words are defined as those 
consisting of three or more syllables. Eq (2), below, describes the formula for calculating the 
Fog Index. Since the Fog Index measures textual complexity, higher values of the Fog Index 
indicate less readable disclosures. A standard interpretation of Fog Index values is that they 
denote the number of years of formal education necessary in order for a reader to clearly 
understand a text on a first reading. 
Fog Index = 0.4 [(
No. words
No. sentences




The Fog Index originates from the computational linguistics literature but it has been widely 
used in Accounting and Finance studies examining readability. Recent examples include Li 
(2008), Lehavy et al. (2011), Dougal et al. (2012), Li and Zhang (2015), and Hsieh et al. (2016). 
We therefore provide results based on the Fog Index to facilitate comparability with related 
studies.  
The Fog Index, and in particular, the determination of ‘complex’ words, is not without 
criticism. The SEC’s (1998, p. 30) guidance on Plain English advocates the use of “short, 
common words” in place of jargon, even those that are likely to be familiar to industry experts.15 
Rennekamp (2012) suggests that simplification of text in this way facilitates information 
processing, while not necessarily affecting ultimate comprehension of information 
communicated. Nevertheless, Loughran and McDonald (2014, p.1645) criticise the use of the 
                                                          
14 We also obtain consistent results when measuring readability as the average length of sentences, and when 
using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level formula. 
15 The SEC (1998, p. 31) suggest the following: “Surround complex ideas with short, common words. For 
example, use end instead of terminate, explain rather than elucidate, and use instead of utilize. When a shorter, 
simpler synonym exists, use it” (emphasis in the original). In each of these examples, readability is facilitated by 
using words of one or two syllables rather than alternatives of three syllables or more. 
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Fog Index to measure the readability of financial disclosures, arguing that frequently used 
words in a financial context, such as ‘financial’ and ‘management’, are treated as difficult to 
understand when they are not. By contrast, the Bog Index incorporates a more reliable measure 
of word difficulty, based on a proprietary dictionary rather than the number of syllables. 
Li (2008) suggests that a Fog Index value of 18 or greater indicates that a text is unreadable. 
We estimate the Fog of CD&As in our sample to have a mean of 23.6 (median = 23.4), with a 
range of between 18.3 and 43.5 suggesting every CD&A in our sample would be considered 
unreadable. From the standard interpretation of Fog, our data suggests that at least 18.3 years 
of formal education are required in order to comprehend a CD&A on first reading. We also 
observe considerable persistence in readability over time, with a serial-correlation of 0.74 
(0.79) between the Bog (Fog) of CD&A in successive years.16  
3.4 Institutional Ownership 
We collect details of institutional investor ownership, at the end of the most recent quarter prior 
to the SOP vote, from Thomson One Banker, and measure total institutional ownership as the 
proportion of outstanding shares held by all 13-F institutional investors (%Inst).17 Since 
monitoring is likely to involve fixed costs in terms of information processing, greater 
monitoring activity is expected in the presence of large institutional shareholders, who may 
benefit from economies of scale (Chen et al., 2007). 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
A full set of descriptive statistics is provided in Table 2. We observe the mean (median) 
proportion of dissenting votes to be relatively low, at just over 9% (4%), consistent with 
                                                          
16  Due to the strong persistence in the readability of firms’ CD&A, we cluster standard errors at the firm-level in 
our regression analyses. 
17 We also obtain consistent results when employing the proportion of shares held by institutional blockholders 
(institutions owning at least 5% of outstanding shares). 
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samples examined by prior studies (Brunarski et al., 2015). Since this variable is highly 
skewed, we consider its use as a continuous dependent variable, within a conventional OLS 
regression framework, to be potentially problematic. Moreover, Brunarski et al. (2015) 
advocate focusing on the conditional probability of receiving greater than 30% Dissent 
(receiving lower than 70% support), since firms exceeding this threshold, in particular, are 
subject to significant increased scrutiny. Consistent with this view, Ertimur et al. (2013) 
demonstrate that firms’ responsiveness to SOP dissent increases discontinuously as the 
proportion of dissenting votes exceeds 30%.18 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
A correlation matrix for our main variables is presented in Table 3. We observe a slight positive 
correlation between Bog and Excess comp (ρ=0.09), and Fog and Excess comp (ρ=0.06), 
consistent with deliberate obfuscation. The correlation between Bog and Dissent, and Fog and 
Dissent, however is slightly positive (ρ=0.04 and 0.06, respectively), rather than negative, 
which is inconsistent with the obfuscation hypothesis that low readability reduces Dissent. A 
more substantive correlation is found between Excess comp and Dissent (ρ=0.35), consistent 
with prior findings that Dissent is particularly sensitive to excesses in CEO pay (Brunarski et 
al, 2015).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We visually examine the three-way relationship between Dissent, Excess comp, and Bog (Fog) 
further in Figure 1, Panel A (Panel B). In Panel A of Figure 1 we plot the frequency of firms 
obtaining dissenting SOP outcomes (greater than 30% of votes cast against) across 25 groups 
based on quintiles of Bog, and quintiles of Excess comp (5x5 groups). In Panel B, we substitute 
                                                          
18 For robustness, we re-estimate our models using OLS regressions, and employ continuous measures for SOP 
Dissent (%) and our readability measures. The results are presented in Section 4.3.5. 
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Fog instead of Bog as the readability measure. Intuitively, the frequency of Dissent is greater 
when Excess comp is in the highest quintile, however the frequency of Dissent for firms with 
Quint5 Excess comp increases near-monotonically, and substantially, across Bog/Fog quintiles. 
This lends indicative support to hypothesis 2, that lower CD&A readability strengthens the link 
between excess CEO pay and SOP dissent. Of firms with the most over-paid CEOs (Quint5 
Excess comp) and also the least readable CD&A (either Quint5 Bog in Panel A or Quint5 Fog 
in Panel B), we observe 42 instances of Dissent. This compares with only 13 and 8 instances, 
respectively for firms with equally over-paid CEOs (Quint5 Excess comp) but produce among 
the most readable CD&A, indicated by Quint1 Bog and Quint1 Fog.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3.6 Empirical Model 
To examine the potential moderating effect of CD&A readability on the link between Dissent 
and Excess comp, we estimate the following logit regression model: 
Dissenti,t = α + β1Excess compi,t + β2High Bogi,t + β3Excess compi,t ∗ High Bogi,t
    + β4 ln(tenurei,t) + β5IVOLi,t + β6Neg_RETi,t + β7RETi,t + β8Neg_RETi,t ∗ RETi,t 
+ β9Lossi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11Lossi,t ∗ ROAi,t + β12EDeci,t + β13dROAi,t           
+ β14EDeci,t ∗ ROAi,t + β15ln (salesi,t) +  γ. year + δ. industry + εi,t                  
(3) 
Where Dissent is an indicator variable equal to 1 if greater than 30% of votes are cast ‘against’ 
proposed executive pay in the SOP, and 0 otherwise; Excess comp, a measure of the 
excessiveness of CEO pay, as described in Section 3.2, is measured as the residual from Eq. 
(1); High Bog is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the Bog Index value of the CD&A is above 
the median for all observations in our sample, and 0 otherwise; and IVOL is the idiosyncratic 
volatility of stock returns over the 12 months to the fiscal year-end, calculated as the Root 
Mean Squared Error (RMSE) from the Fama-French 3 factor model. RET, ROA, and ln(sales) 
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are as previously defined. We also include Neg_RET, equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 
otherwise; Loss, equal to 1 if ROA is negative, and 0 otherwise; dROA, the percentage change 
in ROA between years t-1 and t; and EDec (earnings decline), equal to 1 if dROA is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. We include interactions between Neg_RET and RET, Loss and ROA, and EDec 
and dROA to control for possible non-linear effects of performance on Dissent.19 In some tests 
we substitute High Bog with High Fog, an indicator equal to 1 for observations with above-
median values of Fog Index, and 0 otherwise. 
Our main coefficients of interest are β2 on High Bog (High Fog), which serves as the basis for 
testing hypothesis 1, and β3 on the interaction between Excess comp and High Bog (High Fog), 
which serves as the basis for testing hypothesis 2.20 According to the obfuscation hypothesis, 
lower readability reduces the probability of Dissent (i.e., β2 < 0). On the other hand, the 
processing fluency hypothesis predicts lower readability will strengthen the link between 
Excess comp and the probability of Dissent (i.e., β3 > 0). 
4.   Empirical Results 
4.1 Predicting Say-on-Pay Dissent 
We first examine the conditional probability of receiving greater than 30% voting dissent, 
Dissent, given Excess comp, High Bog (or High Fog), and their interaction, within a logistic 
regression framework using the full sample. The results are presented in Table 4.  In models 
(1) and (2) we estimate Eq. (3) using the full sample, while in models (3)-(4) and (5)-(7) we 
run estimations using underpay and overpay sub-samples. The overpay sub-sample comprises 
observations with positive values for Excess comp, whereas the underpay sub-sample 
                                                          
19 Shareholder dissatisfaction with management may increase discontinuously if they fail to meet basic 
performance thresholds, e.g., if earnings or stock returns over the year are below zero. 
20  We are mindful of the empirical challenges in interpreting coefficients on interactions from logistic regressions. 
We therefore employ graphical analyses to supplement our modelling, which are discussed in more detail in the 
next section.  
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comprises observations with negative values. In the interest of brevity, we present results using 
High Fog for the overpay sample only, i.e., model (7). In models (1), (3), and (5) we restrict 
β2 and β3 to zero. In each of the alternative specifications presented in Table 4, with the 
exception of model (4) which examines only the underpay sample, the estimated coefficient on 
Excess comp is positive and highly significant. Thus, consistent with Brunarski et al. (2015), 
we observe that excessive CEO pay significantly increases the likelihood of Dissent. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally as expected, with a higher 
probability of Dissent for firms with lower stock returns (RET), lower profitability (ROA), and 
earnings declines (EDec), and for firms with longer-serving CEOs (log of Tenure). Firms with 
longer-serving CEOs having a higher probability of Dissent is consistent with the notion that 
CEO entrenchment leads to greater agency problems and Correa and Lel’s (2016) finding that 
SOP helps to address these problems. Holding all else equal, we also find that larger firms are 
more likely to receive Dissent. It is possible that this reflects the concentration of public 
scrutiny on the highest paid CEOs, since ln(Total comp) is strongly correlated with firm size 
as measured by the log of Sales (ρ = 0.73). Excess comp is, by construction, orthogonal to the 
pronounced size effect that explains much of the variation in Total comp; i.e., it captures 
abnormal pay, as opposed to high pay, per se. 
In models (2), (4), and (6) we include High Bog, as well as the interaction with Excess comp. 
We find the main effect of High Bog on Dissent to be negative but insignificant in each case. 
Though insignificant, a negative coefficient on High Bog is directionally consistent with 
obfuscation at low levels of Excess comp. We observe a positive and significant coefficient 
however on the interaction between Excess comp and High Bog in the full sample (model 2) 
and the overpay sample (model 6). A positive estimated coefficient of 0.738 on the Excess 
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comp*High Bog interaction in the overpay sample (model 6, t-stat = 1.98) suggests that the 
sensitivity of Dissent to Excess comp is more pronounced for firms with less readable CD&A 
(High Bog = 1). The coefficient on Excess comp also reduces from 2.302 in model (5) to 1.891 
in model (6), consistent with the notion that the sensitivity of Dissent to Excess comp is lower 
when CD&A are more readable (High Bog = 0).  
We present results using High Fog in place of High Bog in model (7), using the overpay sample. 
We observe a significantly negative coefficient for High Fog and a significantly positive 
coefficient for the Excess comp*High Fog interaction variable. At low levels of Excess comp, 
the negative coefficient on High Fog dominates suggesting that low CD&A readability results 
in lower dissent due to obfuscation. At higher values of Excess comp, however, the increased 
likelihood of Dissent given Excess comp due to low readability (indicated by a significantly 
positive β3), outweighs the negative level effect of High Fog. This suggests that a critical value 
of Excess comp exists, above which the obfuscation effect of low readability gives way to 
increased scepticism (processing fluency effects).  
We also present at the foot of Table 4 the average marginal effect of Excess comp, as well as 
the average marginal effect of Excess comp when High Bog or High Fog is 0 (1) separately. 
The statistics support the above interpretation of our coefficient estimates. In particular, in 
relation to model (6) we observe that a unit increase in Excess comp is associated with a 16% 
increase in the probability of Dissent when High Bog is 0 but a 22.3% increase when High Bog 
is 1.  In relation to model (7) we observe that a change in High Fog from 0 to 1 is associated 
with a doubling of the average marginal effect of Excess comp from 12.4% to 25.2%. 
Interpretation of the coefficients on interaction terms in logit regressions, however, is 
problematic, since the magnitude and direction of the interaction effect can differ to that of the 
estimated coefficient (Ai & Norton, 2003). Moreover, according to Greene (2010, p. 295) 
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statistical testing about partial effects of interaction terms in non-linear models “produces 
generally uninformative and sometimes contradictory and misleading results”, and graphical 
analyses are recommended as an addendum. We therefore follow Greene (2010) and De Jong 
et al. (2012) in producing graphical displays where values of the interacted variables are plotted 
against the predicted probability given the estimated model. 
In Panel A (Panel B) of Figure 2 we display the predicted probability of Dissent in relation to 
values of the interacted variables Excess comp and High Bog (High Fog), based on model 6 
(model 7) of Table 4. We plot two lines, one for the case when High Bog (High Fog) = 0, and 
another for the case when High Bog (High Fog) = 1. All other variables in the model are held 
at their mean value. In each case, the lines denote the predicted probability of Dissent over a 
range of values of Excess comp. Divergence between the two lines thereby depicts the impact 
of the interaction effect on the probability of Dissent. For ease of interpretation, we express 
Excess comp in terms of standard deviations away from the mean, which, by construction, is 
approximately zero.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
In Panel A (Panel B) of Figure 2 we observe that the interaction between Excess comp and 
High Bog (High Fog) serves to widen the distance between the plotted predicted probabilities. 
This indicates that the positive effect of Excess comp on the probability of Dissent is greater 
when High Bog (High Fog) = 1 than when High Bog (High Fog) = 0, consistent with hypothesis 
2. According to the Bog readability measure in Panel A, the probability of Dissent when Excess 
comp is two standard deviations greater than the mean is 27.5% when High Bog = 1, but much 
lower at 17.8% when High Bog = 0. Strikingly, according to the Fog readability measure in 
Panel B, the probability of Dissent when Excess comp is two standard deviations greater than 
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the mean is over twice as high when the readability of the CD&A is low (33.9% when High 
Fog = 1 versus 13.8% when High Fog = 0). 
4.2 The Role of Institutional Monitoring 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effect of CD&A readability on the conditional probability of 
Dissent given Excess comp is greater for firms with low levels of institutional ownership. In 
Table 5, we estimate Eq. (3) using sub-samples of firms with high and low levels of institutional 
shareholdings. High (low) institutional ownership (IO) comprises firms with above (below) 
median values of %Inst (percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors). 
Results for the full sample are presented in models (1) and (2), while results for the overpay 
sample are presented in models (3)-(6). We present results using Bog in models (1)-(4), and 
results using Fog in models (5)-(6). 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
In models (1) and (2), we observe that the coefficients on High Bog and Excess comp*High 
Bog become insignificant when splitting the full sample by high/low institutional ownership. 
In models (3) and (4), however, where we examine only the overpay sample, we observe a 
significantly positive coefficient on Excess comp*High Bog in the low IO sub-sample (model 
4), but not the high IO sub-sample (model 3). We conclude, therefore, that our findings lend 
support for hypothesis 3, that the effect of CD&A readability on the conditional probability of 
Dissent, given Excess comp, is greater for firms with more unsophisticated shareholders. This 
is consistent with less sophisticated investors relying more on heuristic processing, rather than 
systematic processing. Consistent with this conjecture, we also find some evidence of 
obfuscation in the low IO sub-sample (model 4) at low values of Excess comp, indicated by a 
significantly negative coefficient on High Bog. We observe a significantly positive coefficient 
on High Bog in the high IO sub-sample (model 3), indicating that more sophisticated investors 
29 
 
are likely to be more sceptical of overpaid management as a result of low CD&A readability, 
irrespective of the magnitude of Excess comp.  
We obtain qualitatively similar results in models (5) and (6), using the Fog measure of CD&A 
readability. In particular, the coefficient on Excess comp*High Fog is larger and more 
significant in model (6), where IO is low, and we observe evidence of obfuscation (negative 
coefficient on High Fog) when IO is low (model 6) but not when IO is high (model 5). 
Taken together, our results corroborate, to some extent, the existence of a negative level effect 
of High Bog (High Fog) on Dissent, consistent with the obfuscation hypothesis and the results 
obtained by Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) in the UK context. However, we also observe a positive 
interaction effect of High Bog (High Fog) with Excess comp, indicating that the obfuscation 
effect of low readability gives way to heightened shareholder scepticism and dissent when CEO 
pay is highly excessive, consistent with the predicted effects of the processing fluency heuristic. 
This finding suggests that while obfuscation may be successful in attenuating shareholder 
dissent, this appears to be constrained to cases where CEO pay is at moderate levels. When 
CEO pay is clearly excessive, compared with firms sharing similar characteristics, 
unscrupulous firms looking to reduce the probability of shareholder dissent, would do better to 
disclose a ‘plain English’ (i.e., more readable) CD&A rather than attempt to obfuscate pay 
arrangements. 
Whilst Hooghiemstra et al. (2017) find some evidence of increased dissent following low 
readability for firms with high levels of institutional ownership, we find that both the 
obfuscation (negative level effect) and processing fluency (positive moderating effect on 
Excess comp) effects of low readability are most pronounced for firms with more 
unsophisticated investors. This is consistent with the notion that unsophisticated investors are 
more likely to rely on heuristic processing. Consistent with Hooghiemstra et al. (2017), we find 
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no evidence of successful obfuscation for firms with high levels of institutional ownership, 
though we find evidence that low readability results in greater Dissent for high IO firms, as 
well as low IO firms. 
4.3 Additional Analyses 
4.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
Our methodology, so far, may be vulnerable to an endogeneity bias associated with omitted 
factors which may jointly determine CD&A readability and moderate the relationship between 
Excess comp and Dissent. It is plausible that when managers’ interests are misaligned with 
those of shareholders, firms, in addition to awarding excessive CEO compensation, choose to 
disclose unreadable remuneration disclosures. In this case, our results may be driven by 
shareholders’ aptitude to perceive underlying agency problems irrespective of CD&A 
readability. Thus, the heightened probability of SOP dissent for this group may not be affected 
by CD&A readability directly, and without accounting for omitted factors, our estimations 
could be biased. 
In order to address the potential endogeneity problem, we conduct propensity score matching 
(PSM) based on the propensity for Bog (Fog) to be in the top quartile of its distribution (Q4), 
similar to Hooghiemstra et al. (2017). Specifically, we estimate a propensity score for Q4 Bog 
using a logit model containing the same covariates as our main model depicted in Eq. (3), 
except for High Bog and the Excess comp*High Bog interaction. We estimate the conditional 
probability of Q4 Bog using the logit model specified in Eq. (4) below.  
Q4 Bogi,t = α + β1Excess compi,t +  β4 ln(tenurei,t) + β5IVOLi,t + β6Neg_RETi,t
         +β7RETi,t + β8Neg_RETi,t ∗ RETi,t +  β9Lossi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11Lossi,t ∗ ROAi,t
+β12EDeci,t + β13dROAi,t + β14EDeci,t ∗ ROAi,t + β15ln (salesi,t)                




All variables are as defined previously (and in Appendix A). We use nearest-neighbour 
matching, with replacement, to match treatment observations (Q4 Bog) with control 
observations (where Bog is below median, i.e., ≤ Q2). For each Q4 Bog observation, we first 
identify a pool of possible matches which (a) have below median levels of Bog, and also (b) 
share either a high or low (above or below median) level of institutional ownership (%Inst). 
We match with the observation within this pool having the closest propensity score, using a 
0.01 calliper to ensure reasonable balance in propensity scores. We estimate the propensity 
scores and perform the matching using observations from the overpay sample only. We repeat 
the procedure above using Fog in place of Bog, thereby constructing a propensity-score 
matched sample for both readability measures. 
Summary statistics for the matched sample are provided in Table 6. We analyse differences 
between treatment (Bog = Q4 or Fog = Q4) and control (Bog ≤ Q2 or Fog ≤ Q2) groups using 
standardised mean differences (SMD),21 two-sample t-tests, and nonparametric Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank tests. Panel A of Table 6 presents results from matching on the Bog 
Index, while Panel B present results by matching on the Fog Index. In Panel A, we observe 
statistically significant differences in the outcome variable, Dissent, though the SMD are 
somewhat lower than 20, indicating that the differences are small. Thus, all else equal, 
treatment (Q4 Bog) observations are more likely to receive dissenting votes. In Panel B, we 
observe a similar difference in mean/median Dissent between treatment and control groups 
based on Fog.  
                                                          
21 Standardised mean differences (SMD) are calculated as the difference in means between treatment and control 
groups, divided by the common standard deviation. Cohen (1969) proposes SMD (sometimes referred to as 
Cohen’s d) as a measure of effect size, suggesting a minimum value of 20 before acknowledging the existence of 
a small difference (with values 50 and 80 indicating medium and large differences, respectively). Thus we 




We observe balance between treatment and control groups on all other observed variables in 
Panel A, according to the SMD and t-stat criterion, but a weakly significant difference in IVOL 
and ln(Sales) according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We observe a more significant 
difference in IVOL between groups in Panel B, as well as a weakly significant difference in 
Neg_RET. We consider therefore that the matching procedure achieves reasonable balance. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We re-estimate Eq. (3) on the propensity score matched samples using conditional logistic 
regressions, and report the results based on the Bog Index (Fog Index) in Panel A (Panel B) of 
Table 7. We employ conditional logistic regressions in Table 7 in order to take into account 
the matched nature of the sample.22 In each case, we report results for the matched overpay 
sample as well as sub-samples based on high and low institutional ownership. The results are 
qualitatively consistent with those presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. In particular, we find that 
the coefficient on the Excess comp*High Bog (Excess comp*High Fog) interaction remains 
positive and significant in all regressions, following the PSM procedure. This strongly suggests 
that CD&A readability, itself, as opposed to underlying agency problems, moderates the link 
between excess CEO compensation and SOP dissent. We also find that the Excess comp*High 
Bog (Excess comp*High Fog) interaction in both Panels is larger (and more significant) for 
firms with low, compared with high, levels of institutional ownership, consistent with our 
findings in Section 4.2. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3.2 Shareholder Participation in the SOP 
                                                          
22 Since the matching is performed on the basis of High Bog (High Fog), this variable is omitted from the 
conditional logistic regressions. 
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While we examine, above, whether CD&A readability affects the voting preferences of 
shareholders taking part in the vote, a further important question is whether CD&A readability 
affects shareholders’ decisions to vote at all. Hence, as an additional analysis, we examine 
whether the proportion of shares unambiguously voted during the SOP is affected by CD&A 
readability. When CD&A are excessively complex and costly to process, shareholders may 
simply decide not to vote at all. In this sense, low CD&A readability may exacerbate the 
problem of shareholder apathy, or disengagement in governance issues by (mainly small) 
shareholders. 
To examine the possible effects on voting participation, we construct SOP Participation as the 
total number of shares voted either ‘for’ or ‘against’ in the SOP, divided by the number of 
shares outstanding at the date of the proxy statement. We therefore consider both ‘abstain’ 
votes and non-votes as non-participation, since no voting preference is expressed either way. 
We assume that the number of shares outstanding equates with the total number of eligible 
votes, as is the case with a one share, one vote policy. We therefore drop observations 
corresponding to firms with multiple share classes or unequal voting rights, which reduces our 
sample to 2,024 observations with ownership data.  
We estimate an adaptation of Eq. (3) using OLS regression, with SOP Participation as the 
dependent variable, and including %Inst as an additional independent variable. The results are 
presented in Table 8. Consistent with the argument that small shareholders are less likely than 
institutional shareholders to engage with the SOP, we find that SOP Participation is 
significantly positively related with %Inst. For every additional 1% increase in %Inst, SOP 
Participation increases by approximately 0.34%. We find no evidence that SOP Participation 
increases with Excess comp, or CD&A readability, as the coefficients on High Bog (High Fog) 
and the High Bog*Excess comp (High Fog*Excess comp) interaction are insignificant. While 
we, therefore, conclude that variations in CD&A readability have no detectible marginal effect 
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on shareholder participation, preconceptions that CD&A and compensation arrangements are 
highly complex may still be a factor explaining disengagement by small shareholders. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.3.3 Interplay with Negative Media Coverage 
While the primary focus of our paper is on the effects of CD&A readability on SOP voting 
decisions, we acknowledge that a complementary strand of literature suggests that negative or 
critical media coverage of related executives’ pay may also increase SOP dissent 
(Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). Media scrutiny plays a role in highlighting cases of excess CEO 
compensation (Core et al., 2008), and firms receiving negative compensation-related media 
coverage tend to fare worse in the SOP (Hooghiemstra et al., 2015). If the way a CD&A is 
written affects the way shareholders perceive excess CEO pay, it may also affect the views 
formed by journalists. Thus, negative media coverage may be related with low CD&A 
readability, and may even amplify (or wholly explain) the effects of readability on Dissent. 
The incidence of media articles scrutinising executive pay, however, has been shown to be 
related with Excess comp (Core et al., 2008), which is a strong predictor of Dissent (Brunarski 
et al, 2015). Therefore, an association between readability and media scrutiny (and ultimately, 
Dissent) may also exist if each is symptomatic of significant agency problems. On the other 
hand, if media scrutiny is related with agency problems (as suggested by Core et al., 2008), but 
CD&A readability is not, then we may observe no significant relationship between negative 
media coverage and readability. 
We therefore construct and merge a database of negative media articles regarding executive 
compensation at companies in our sample. Following Hooghiemstra et al. (2015), media 
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articles relating to executive pay are obtained from the Lexis Nexis database using the 
following search string: 
(Company Name) AND (CEO Name) w/20 (compensation OR salary OR bonus 
OR option OR restricted stock) 
We retain only articles published between the date of publication of the CD&A and the 
corresponding AGM where the SOP vote is held.23 The remaining articles are categorised as 
‘negative’ if at least one match is made with the search string for negative news developed by 
Core et al. (2008), outlined in Appendix C. 
In Panel A of Table 9, we estimate a variation of Eq. (3) where Neg_Cov is substituted as the 
dependent variable. Neg_Cov is an indicator variable equal to 1 for observations where at least 
one negative article is published between the dates of the CD&A and the AGM, and 0 
otherwise. The results indicate firm size (log of Sales) to be the most significant predictor of 
negative media coverage suggesting, as expected, the mainstream media are more likely to 
cover larger, more visible firms (Core et al., 2008; Fang & Peress, 2009). Consistent with Core 
et al. (2008), we also find Excess comp to be a significant predictor of negative media coverage 
in the overpay sample, with more excessively paid CEOs being significantly more likely to 
attract negative media coverage. The results in Panel A, however, provide no evidence of a 
relationship between CD&A readability and the propensity for negative media coverage. This 
lends some support to the notion that CD&A readability is not strongly related to agency 
problems, if we assume that media scrutiny is. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
                                                          
23 We obtain AGM dates from the EDGAR database. Specifically, AGM dates are listed as the ‘Period of Report’ 
on DEF 14A submissions. In a small number of cases where this rule did not appear to hold, we manually extract 
the AGM date from the text of the DEF 14A filing. 
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In Panel B of Table 9, we estimate a variation of Eq. (3) with Dissent as the dependent variable, 
however we include Neg_Cov as an additional independent variable, as well as a full set of 
interactions between Neg_Cov, Excess comp, and High Bog (High Fog). The specification used 
in Panel B therefore tests the robustness of our findings when controlling for the publication of 
negative articles, and explores whether negative coverage amplifies/attenuates the effects of 
excess CEO pay and/or CD&A readability on Dissent. In general, we observe that our main 
inferences are robust when controlling for Neg_Cov, as the coefficient on High Bog*Excess 
comp (High Fog*Excess comp) is significantly positive in each case. We find that the inclusion 
of Neg_Cov has little impact, with insignificant coefficients estimated on all but one of the 
added covariates. This implies limited incremental predictability of Dissent from negative 
media coverage, above the original specification of Eq. (3). 
4.3.4 Sensitivity to Length of Notice and the Volume of AGMs 
Our main arguments regarding to the effects of CD&A readability on SOP voting outcomes 
rely on the presumption that shareholders have sufficient time to thoroughly review the CD&A. 
In practice, shareholders’ attention is constrained (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). Delayed 
reactions to news suggest it can take some time for investors to process new information (Hong 
et al., 2000), while extraneous events can be distracting, attenuating investor attention further 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2009). For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) report that post earnings 
announcement drifts are typically more pronounced when the volume of same-day earnings 
announcements is greater, as firms compete for investor attention. 
Given the length of detail in the typical CD&A (approx. 10,000 words on average) and the 
volume of CD&As that are published (especially during the peak of the proxy season), 
shareholders may not always have the time or inclination to fully review each CD&A before 
voting. In particular, shareholders might be less likely to review the CD&A (and be affected 
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by its readability): (1) when the length of time between publication of the CD&A and the AGM 
is shorter; and (2) when there is a greater number of competing AGMs taking place at the same 
time, assuming that shareholders hold diversified portfolios.  
We use these expectations to form the bases for additional sensitivity analyses, to further test 
whether our main results are likely to be driven by CD&A readability per se, as opposed to 
underlying agency problems that may simultaneously determine higher dissent and lower 
readability. We argue that if our results are driven by readability directly, then they will be 
attenuated when shareholders are more constrained in their ability to thoroughly review the 
CD&A. We therefore re-estimate Eq. (3) using sub-samples constructed by splitting on the 
variables Short_notice and Busy. Short_notice is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the 
number of days between publication of the CD&A and the AGM is below the median value, 
and 0 otherwise. Busy is an indicator equal to 1 if the number of AGMs of S&P 1500 firms 
occurring on the same day is above its median value, and 0 otherwise. 
The results using the Bog Index (Fog Index) readability measure are presented in Panel A 
(Panel B) of Table 10. For brevity, we report only the results for the overpay sample. Overall, 
we observe that our main findings of a negative coefficient on High Bog (High Fog) and a 
positive coefficient on the High Bog*Excess comp (High Fog*Excess comp) interaction are 
strongest in the cases where there is a longer duration between CD&A publication and the 
AGM (Short_notice = 0), and when there are fewer competing AGMs taking place on the same 
day (Busy = 0). To reiterate, we expect that there is a greater likelihood of shareholders 
reviewing the CD&A under these circumstances, given lower constraints on investor attention. 
These findings therefore support the argument that the level of SOP dissent is affected by 
CD&A readability, directly. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
38 
 
4.3.5 Using Continuous Readability and SOP Measures 
We acknowledge that our methodology is somewhat limited since we employ both a binary 
measure of SOP dissent and a binary readability variable. While we adopt this methodological 
approach due to our expectation of non-linear effects as well as high skewness of SOP voting 
results, it is established that there are inherent problems with interpreting coefficients on 
interactions in logistic frameworks (Ai & Norton, 2003), as discussed in Section 4.1. We 
therefore present additional results in Table 11 from conventional OLS estimations of Eq. (3) 
but employing a continuous measure of SOP dissent (% Dissent) as well as continuous 
measures of CD&A readability, Bog and Fog. % Dissent is the untransformed percentage of 
shares voted ‘against’ in the SOP. Bog and Fog are the untransformed readability measures 
discussed in Section 3.3. We centre Bog and Fog to have a mean of zero, as recommended by 
Dawson (2014) in order to aide interpretation of the interaction effect.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
In general, our main result of a significantly positive coefficient on the Bog*Excess comp 
(Fog*Excess comp) interaction is robust to employing continuous variables in an OLS 
framework, with the exception of the coefficient on Bog*Excess comp in the overpay sample 
(though we do observe a significantly positive coefficient in the full sample). The weakening 
of our results within a linear framework suggests the existence of non-linear effects, as 
previously mentioned. We do not observe a significant coefficient on Bog or Fog in any of the 
models presented in Table 11, indicating our previous support of the obfuscation hypothesis 
(hypothesis 1) is limited. We also present in Table 11 the marginal effect of Excess comp at 
varying levels of Bog/Fog, namely at their 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values, and observe 
that the marginal effect on Excess comp is significant yet increases with Bog/Fog in all cases. 
We express caution over interpretation of the results in Table 11, however, since they are likely 
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to be disproportionately driven by variations among the large number of observations with very 
low levels of SOP dissent. 
4.3.6 Potential Impact of Poor Performance on Readability 
Finally, as a further robustness test, we estimate a variation of Eq. (3) which includes 
interactions between the negative performance indicators Neg_RET, Loss, and EDec, and High 
Bog (High Fog), as well as with Excess comp. To the extent that poor performance might be 
more difficult to explain, the estimated effect of CD&A readability on Dissent and the 
interaction with Excess comp might be driven by an omitted (but correlated) effect of 
particularly disappointing performance on shareholder dissatisfaction. The results are 
presented in Table 12, and indicate that our inferences are robust to this alternative explanation. 
In particular, the coefficients on the Excess comp*High Bog (Excess comp*High Fog) 
interaction remain significantly positive and are of a similar magnitude to those in Table 4. In 
addition, we observe a significantly positive coefficient on the Excess comp*EDec interaction 
across all models, suggesting that shareholders have even lower tolerance of high CEO pay 
when earnings have declined from the previous year. 
 [Insert Table 12 about here] 
5.   Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence on the effect of remuneration disclosure readability on Say-on-
Pay voting patterns in the US. Specifically, while low readability in the Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) may, in some cases successfully obfuscate excess CEO pay, 
resulting in lower SOP dissent (as reported by Hooghiemstra et al., 2017), this effect appears 
to be constrained to cases where Excess pay is low. At higher values of Excess pay (i.e., when 
CEO pay excesses are greater) we find that shareholders are more likely to vote ‘against’ 
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abnormally high CEO compensation when the CD&A is written in a less readable manner. 
Thus, while at moderate CEO pay levels, a more difficult to read CD&A may ‘put off’ 
shareholders from challenging pay arrangements, low readability results in increased 
scepticism when CEO pay is highly excessive. Our findings are therefore consistent with 
Stathopoulos and Voulgaris’ (2016) view that many shareholders are put off from challenging 
executive pay arrangements unless pay levels are clearly excessive, but add that a Plain English 
CD&A seems to play an important role in quelling those concerns. 
For S&P 1500 companies, we find that, although the probability of Dissent increases with the 
excessiveness of CEO compensation, this sensitivity is substantially reduced when a more 
readable CD&A is issued. For example, considering Excess comp of two standard deviations 
above the mean, the probability of Dissent is substantially higher for low readability firms than 
for high readability firms according to the Bog index measure (27.5% versus 17.8%), and is 
also over twice as high according the Fog index measure of readability (33.9% versus 13.8%). 
Our results are robust to possible confounding determinants of readability, and become muted 
in cases where shareholders are less likely to have sufficient time to review the CD&A. This 
suggests that CD&A readability directly affects the credibility of the ‘compensation story’ in 
cases where there is a clear need to justify the excessiveness of CEO pay. 
We also show that the effects of CD&A readability on SOP dissent (both the level and 
moderating effects) are more pronounced when institutional ownership is low, and therefore 
shareholders in general are likely to be less sophisticated. This suggests that both the 
obfuscation effect of low readability, at low levels of Excess pay, and the processing fluency 
(heightened scepticism) effect of low readability, at higher levels of Excess pay, result from 
heuristic information processing by less-sophisticated investors. While Hooghiemstra et al. 
(2017) observe heterogeneity in the effects of readability on SOP dissent due to ownership 
structure (i.e., an investor sophistication effect), we provide an important contribution by 
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demonstrating that it is also strongly conditional on the degree of excessiveness in CEO pay. 
In particular, we show that the obfuscation effect of low readability appears to be limited to 
cases where Excess pay is moderate, and that it leads to increased dissent, even for firms with 
low institutional ownership, when CEO pay is highly excessive. By contrast, Hooghiemstra et 
al. (2017) suggest low readability increases scepticism and dissent only for firms with high 
levels of institutional ownership. 
The findings in this paper therefore contribute to the literature by highlighting the role of 
remuneration disclosure readability in engendering shareholders’ support of executive pay 
arrangements, and in particular when CEO pay otherwise appears highly excessive. Since 
shareholders’ need for a justification of pay arrangements is likely to increase with the 
excessiveness of CEO pay, it is intuitive that the effect of Plain English remuneration 
disclosures (above less readable disclosures) in engendering trust and support of pay 
arrangements also increases in tow. Our results, therefore, also inform policymakers and 
practitioners regarding the intended consequences of Plain English language in increasing 
shareholders’ trust in, and reliance on, corporate disclosures. However, they also highlight a 
possible unintended consequence, in that greater use of Plain English could potentially be used 
as a tool to lobby for greater shareholder support for excessively paid executives. Further 
research on potential heterogeneity in the effects of Plain English in other contexts (e.g., 10-K 
reports), and how these relate to investors’ prior concerns and trust in management, may also 
shed important new light on the consequences of the Plain English initiative. 
Our study is subject to number of limitations. Firstly, while the focus of our study is on the 
effects of readability on SOP outcomes, we do not comment on whether the consequences of 
SOP dissent are also affected. While we consider this to be outside of the scope of our study, 
it is likely to be fruitful avenue for future research, as it would help to identify whether or not 
the effect of Plain English on SOP outcomes advances shareholders’ interests. Reduced 
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shareholder scepticism may be exploited by managers, thus resulting in even further pay 
excesses. On the other hand, increased trust between shareholders and managers may lead to 
improved governance arrangements.  
Secondly, we examine only variations in the readability of CD&A, and not the content of 
CD&A, more broadly. It is likely that a host of other disclosure characteristics also affect 
shareholder approval of executive pay. For example, graphics and tables could be used to 
increase processing fluency or to highlight arguments that are favourable to management (and 
obfuscate others). Opportunistic choice of peers within comparator groups may also be used 
by managers to inflate support.  
Finally, our approach implies that shareholders’ prior concerns regarding pay arrangements 
(and consequently the effect of CD&A readability) are driven only by the results of 
benchmarking executive pay, however receptiveness to arguments in the remuneration 
disclosure may be primed by a host of other factors affecting shareholders’ trust in 
management. For example, the strength of governance arrangements, or how management 
responded to previous shareholder votes. Whether shareholders’ need for justification of excess 
pay (and therefore the potential impact of CD&A disclosure) is affected by factors outside of 




Variable Names and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: SOP voting and proxy variables 
SOP Dissent (%) The proportion of shares voting ‘against’ proposed executive pay in the Say-on-
Pay advisory vote on executive remuneration. 
Dissent Indicator variable equal to 1 if greater than 30% of votes are cast ‘against’ 
proposed executive pay in the Say-on-Pay, and 0 otherwise. Dissent therefore 
takes the value 1 if less than 70% SOP support is obtained. 
SOP Participation The proportion of total shares outstanding voted either ‘for or ‘against’ proposed 
executive pay in the Say-on-Pay. 
Bog Bog Index value of Compensation Discussion & Analysis text. 
High Bog Indicator variable equal to 1 if Bog is above the median of all firm-years in the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. 
Q4 Bog Indicator variable equal to 1 if Bog is in the top quartile of all firm-years in the 
sample (i.e., above the 75% percentile), and 0 otherwise. 
Fog Fog Index value of Compensation Discussion & Analysis text. 
High Fog Indicator variable equal to 1 if Fog is above the median of all firm-years in the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. 
Q4 Fog Indicator variable equal to 1 if Fog is in the top quartile of all firm-years in the 
sample (i.e., above the 75% percentile), and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: CEO-level variables 
Total comp The CEO’s total compensation at the fiscal year-end in $000’s, as reported in 
the summary compensation table of the DEF 14A 
Excess comp Estimated measure of excess CEO compensation, defined in Section 3.2 as the 
residual from a predictive model of CEO Total comp. The estimated model is 
presented in Table 1. 
Overpay Indicator variable equal to 1 if Excess comp is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
Underpay Indicator variable equal to 1 if Excess comp is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Tenure The tenure of the current CEO at the fiscal year-end, in years. 
Panel C: Firm-level variables 
%Inst Proportion of shares held by 13-F institutional investors at the end of the most 
recent quarter prior to the say on pay vote. 
High IO Indicator variable equal to 1 if %Inst is above the median of all firm-years in 
the sample, and 0 otherwise. 
Low IO Indicator variable equal to 1 if %Inst is below the median of all firm-years in 
the sample, and 0 otherwise. 
TA The value of the firm’s assets as at the fiscal year-end. 
Sales Firm sales as at the fiscal year-end. 
Bk/Mkt The book to market ratio calculated as (book value of assets)/(book value of 
liabilities + market value of equity). 
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S&P500 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is a constituent of the S&P 500 index, 
and 0 otherwise. 
IVOL Idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns over 12 months to the fiscal year-end, 
calculated as the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) from a Fama-French 3 
factor model. 
ROA Operating income scaled by total assets. 
Loss Indicator variable equal to 1 if ROA is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
RET Stock return over the 12 months to the fiscal year-end. 
Neg_RET Indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
dROA Percentage change in ROA between years t-1 and t. 
EDec Indicator variable equal to 1 if dROA is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Contextual variables 
Neg Cov Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations where at least one negative article 
is published between the dates of the CD&A and the AGM, and 0 otherwise, as 
discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
Short notice Indicator variable equal to 1 when the number of days between publication of 
the CD&A and the AGM is below median, and 0 otherwise.  
Busy Indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of AGMs of S&P 1500 firms 
occurring on the same day is above median, and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B: Procedure for parsing the CD&A section of DEF 14A proxy statements.  
1. We obtain the Complete Submission Text File (CSTF) for all DEF 14A filings relating 
to Annual General Meetings, and submitted by firms in the sample to EDGAR between 
2010 and 2015 inclusive, using links published via the following url address:  
ftp://ftp.sec.gov/edgar/full-index/ 
2. The ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ section (CD&A) is isolated and 
extracted from each CSTF in the following manner: 
a. DEF 14A section breaks are identified using HTML links between the text and 
the table of contents. Using HTML, a link to the CD&A section from the table 
of contents may take the following form: 
<a href="#cd&a">Compensation Discussion and Analysis</a> 
With the beginning of the CD&A section specified similarly to the following: 
<a name="cd&a">Compensation Discussion and Analysis</a> 
All links from the table of contents (href attributes), as well as target section 
markers (name attributes) are extracted from each CSTF using regular 
expressions. A find-and-extract operation is performed using each of the two 
regular expressions below: 
Regex1:  (href=.{0,1000}?</a>) 
Regex2:  (name=[^>]+?>) 
Extracted links and targets within each CSTF are matched based on use of a 
common identifier, such that section markers (i.e., “name=identifier>”) are 
matched with the title given in the table of contents (i.e., the string between 
“href=#identifier>” and the first subsequent “</a>”). Data from each CSTF are 
sorted according to the order in which targets occur in the text. 
b. The marker for the beginning of the CD&A section is identified based on 
keyword matching with titles from the table of contents. Specifically, references 
to CD&A sections are identified if the title contains each of the words 
“compensation”, “discussion”, and “analysis”, but none of the following words; 
“report”, “vote”, “supplemental”, “appendix”, and “exhibit”. The beginning of 
the CD&A was identified manually in 25 instances where it was found that this 
keyword search had failed to identify the appropriate marker. 
c. The end of the CD&A is determined as the position in the text where the section 
immediately after the CD&A begins. This poses some difficulty, however, as; 
(a) the CD&A is often divided into sub-sections, each of which is itemised and 
linked within the table of contents; (b) proxy statements do not follow a standard 
format, such that the ordering of sections differs between proxy statements; and 
(c) sections are often titled differently between proxy statements. 
We therefore develop a procedure which screens each subsequent section title 
in turn to determine whether it is likely to be a sub-section of the CD&A. The 
beginning of the first subsequent section determined not to be a sub-section of 
the CD&A is taken to be the end of the CD&A. The process was developed 
inductively, with meticulous checking of the data at each stage to ensure the 
integrity of the procedure. The final form of the procedure is as follows:  
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i. Remove all HTML code from extracted section titles. 
ii. Drop section markers where title consists only of a number, or white-
space followed by a number. 
iii. Drop section markers where there is no title, or where the title consists 
only of white-space characters. 
iv. Where successive section markers are identified as being the beginning 
of the CD&A, keep only the first instance. 
v. Drop proxies where multiple non-successive CD&A section are 
identified, due to ambiguity. 
vi. Where greater than 12,500 characters of string exist between the 
beginning of the CD&A and the next section marker, this indicates that 
CD&A sub-sections are not linked, and the next section marker 
identifies the end of the CD&A. 
vii. Drop first section marker after CD&A if title contains either “report”, 
“vote”, “committee”, “capitalization”, “exelon”, “approval”, 
“compensation of executive officers”, or “investments”. 
viii. Drop section markers that occur fewer than 5,000 characters after the 
CD&A, as inspection of the data found that these relate to CD&A sub-
sections. 
ix.  For each remaining section marker subsequent to the CD&A in turn:24 
a) Identify as end of CD&A if title contains either “report”, 
“interlock”, “table”, or “insider”. 
b) Otherwise, drop if contains either “guideline”, “highlight”, 
“philosophy”, “element”, “policies”, “policy”, “decision”, 
“vote”, “program”, “benefit”, “component”, “salary”, 
“analysis”, “target”, “incentive”, “process”, “principles”, 
“result”, “action”, “practice”, “performance”, “bonus”, “grants”, 
“data”, “summary”, “overview”, “introduction”, “business”, 
“2010 ”, “2011 ”, “2012 ”, “2013 ”, “2014 ”, “design”, 
“background”, “objectives”, “oversight”, “purpose”, “factors”, 
“named”, “governance”, “setting”, “role”, “NEO”, or “base 
salar”. 
c) If is not yet dropped, identify as end of CD&A if title contains 
“risk”, or is greater than 12,500 characters after the CD&A and 
contains “committee”, [“executive” and “compensation”], or 
“officer”.25 Otherwise drop the section marker and repeat step 
                                                          
24 The keyword matches used below result from meticulous checking of each iteration to determine via visual 
inspection whether they exclusively indicate either (a) CD&A sub-sections, or (b) an appropriate ending point for 
the CD&A (i.e., the beginning of the section immediately after the CD&A). 
25 CD&A are commonly followed by the sections “Executive Compensation”, “Compensation of Executive 
Officers”, “Compensation Committee Report”. While these sections are also related to executive remuneration, 
they are generally very technical in nature, consisting mainly of tables and technical notes which support the more 
natural discussion in the CD&A. Since they may not therefore be amenable to textual analysis, we limit our focus 
to the CD&A. 
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ix. for next successive section marker, until an appropriate 
ending is identified. 
d. The text of each DEF 14A is split at the beginning and end of the CD&A, and 
only text between these positions are retained. 
3. The text of CD&As are cleaned prior to analysis in the following manner: 
a. All white-space characters (e.g., newline “\n”, carriage return “\r”, and tab “\t” 
characters) are replaced with an ASCII non-breaking space character. Strings of 
multiple successive non-breaking spaces are replaced with a single non-
breaking space. 
b. All HTML character codes “&#160;”, “&nbsp;”, and “&#32;” are replaced with 
an ASCII non-breaking space. 
c. All HTML character codes “&#8217;” and “&#39;”, denoting an apostrophe, 
are removed from the text without leaving any space. 
d. All instances of HTML character code “&#46;”, denoting a period, are replaced 
with an ASCII period character.  
e. All instances of HTML character code “&amp;”, denoting an ampersand, are 
replaced with the word “and”.  
f. Tables are identified in the text as string occurring in-between HTML tags 
“<table…>” and “</table>”. Similarly to Loughran & McDonald (2011),26 
tables are removed from the text if they contain greater than 15% numeric 
characters. 
g. Each remaining segment of HTML code is replaced with a single ASCII non-
breaking space character. HTML code segments are identified using regular 
expressions "<([^>]+?)>" and "&([^;&]{1,7});". 
h. Since HTML codes are replaced with spaces, a considerable amount of 
additional white-space is introduces. Therefore, any strings of multiple 
successive spaces are again replaced with a single space character. 
i. Where string in-between alphabetic characters contains only a single hyphen “-
” and non-breaking space characters, the space characters are removed. All other 
hyphens are replaced with a space character. These steps are important since 
end of line words are often broken by use of a hyphen. When ‘words’ are 
identified by matching strings against the master dictionary below, strings of 
alphabetic characters separated by a hyphen will be considered both (a) as a 
whole (removing the hyphen), and (b) separately (replacing the hyphen with a 
space). 
j. Since sentences are identified by the occurrence of a period character “.” in the 
string, it is important to remove excess periods from the text which do not 
denote the end of a sentence (e.g., where periods are used as part of an 
                                                          
26 While in Loughran and McDonald (2011, internet appendix) they remove tables which include greater than 
25% numeric characters, in Loughran and McDonald (2016, p. 1221) they apply a threshold of 10%. Loughran 
and McDonald (2016) suggest that HTML table markers are less ambiguous in filings made after 2005. 
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abbreviation). The following steps are implemented to control for extraneous 
uses of the period character: 
i. Periods are removed from strings containing two or more periods, but 
no space characters (e.g., in the instance “w.r.t.”). 
ii. Where the string between successive periods contains only non-breaking 
space characters, only a single period is retained. 
iii. Where a period is immediately preceded by a space followed by a single 
alphabetic character, the period is removed. 
iv. Periods between numeric characters are removed. 
v. Periods are removed when immediately preceded by string consisting of 
a space followed by either “mr”, “inc”, “co”, “vs”, “ft”, “sq”, “jr”, “sr”, 
“ms”, “dr”, “no”, “ex”, “st”, “pp”, “I”, “II”, “III”, “IV”, “V”, “VI”, 
“VII”, “VIII”, “IX”, “X”, “XI”, “XII”, “XIII”, “XIV”, or “XV”. 
vi. Where the string between successive periods does not contain alphabetic 
characters, the entire string is reduced to a single period. 
k. All apostrophes are removed (not replaced with a space).  
l. All remaining non-alphabetic characters are replaced with a space character, 
while strings of successive spaces are again replaced with a single space. 
m. The remaining CD&A text consists only of (a) alphabetic characters, (b) 
hyphens, (c) space characters, and (d) periods. Assuming that the text is cleaned 
appropriately, sentence breaks are identified by occurrences of a period 
character in the text (i.e., the number of period characters is equal to the number 
of sentences). Words are identified as string tokens of alphabetic characters 
(preceded/followed by a space or period), but which also match with any of the 
84,667 words in the 2014 Loughran and McDonald Master Dictionary27 with 
non-missing data on the number of syllables.28 For hyphenated words, a match 
is first attempted on the string as a whole (excluding the hyphen). If this fails to 
match with a word, the hyphen is replaced with a space, and a match is 
attempted on each constituent string token. String tokens which fail to match 
with any word in the Master Dictionary are removed from the text. 
n. Where the removal of string tokens results in successive periods where no words 
occur in the string between them, the extraneous periods are removed. 
Finally, we ensure a standardised distribution of CD&A text, whereby each word and period 
are separated by a single non-breaking space character.
                                                          
27 Available via Bill McDonald’s website at: http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html 
28 The Fog readability measure requires the ability to determine the number of syllables in each word. 
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Appendix C: Search string used to identify negative media articles 
Media articles are coded as ‘negative’ if at least one match is found in the text or the article 
using the following search string:  
 
(CEO name or CEO name’s or executive* or CEO*) w/25   
(high* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit*) 
or excess* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or lofty w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or hefty w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or large w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or rich w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or big* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or outsize* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or huge w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or generous w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or exorbitant* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or fat* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or gargantuan w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or bonanza* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or jumbo w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or whopp* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or astound* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or ridiculous* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or stagger* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or handsome* w/7 (salar* or bonus* or pay* or paid or compensat* or benefit* or option*) 
or lucrative w/7 (pay* or compensat* or option*) 
or critic* w/7 (pay* or compensat*) 
or best w/7 paid 








or earn* more than 
or was paid more than 
or receiv* more than 
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Cross-sectional regressions for estimating excess pay 
 Dependent variable 





















Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Adj. R2 0.539 
This table reports estimates from cross-sectional predictions of log total CEO compensation. We present 
OLS results using the full sample of 7,733 S&P 1500 firm-years between 2008 and 2014 for brevity, though 
calculate Excess comp in year t as the residual from estimating Eq. (1) using observations from years t-2 to t. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry, following the Fama 
and French 12 industry classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 







Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 1st Median 99th 
Bog 96.53 11.27 76 96 127 
Fog 23.59 1.950 19.82 23.42 29.12 
Total Comp ($000’s) 8,595 8,055 761.1 6,479 36,273 
Excess comp 0.0763 0.551 -1.392 0.0749 1.560 
SOP Dissent (%) 9.133 12.93 0.260 4.040 66.71 
Tenure (years) 8.001 6.005 1 6.583 32 
IVOL 1.425 0.691 0.623 1.259 3.622 
RET 13.14 27.23 -65.01 13.84 80.22 
ROA 0.092 0.085 -0.036 0.080 0.343 
Loss 0.040 0.195 0 0 1 
dROA 0.002 0.044 -0.122 0.002 0.138 
Sales ($millions) 11,850 33,760 105.0 2,788 138,074 
TA ($millions) 36,464 169,440 156.0 5,240 781,960 
Mk/Bk 2.025 3.780 1.042 1.461 9.181 
This table presents sample summary statistics for our full-sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 firm-year observations 


















Pearson correlation matrix 
Variable  A B C D E F G H I J 
SOP Dissent (%) A 1.00          
            
Ln(Total comp) B 0.24*** 1.00         
  (0.00)          
Excess comp C 0.35*** 0.53*** 1.00        
  (0.00) (0.00)         
Bog D 0.04** 0.03 0.09*** 1.00       
  (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)        
Fog E 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.06*** 0.73*** 1.00      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Ln(Tenure) F 0.12*** -0.03 0.13*** 0.01 0.07*** 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00)      
IVOL G 0.09*** -0.32*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.04** 1.00    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06)     
RET H -0.18*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10*** 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.28) (0.54) (0.55) (0.17) (0.00)    
ROA I -0.10*** 0.13*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03* -0.07*** 0.11*** 1.00  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.23) (0.39) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00)   
Ln(Sales) J 0.02 0.73*** -0.14*** -0.04** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.34*** -0.01 0.11*** 1.00 
  (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00)  
This table presents Pearson correlations between the variables employed in our main analyses, for our full sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 firm-year observations between 





Determinants of high SOP dissent 
Dependent variable: Dissent (1 if greater than 30% votes cast ‘against’) 
 Full sample Underpay sample Overpay sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Excess comp 2.202*** 1.909*** 1.481** 1.372 2.302*** 1.891*** 1.505*** 
 (12.18) (8.31) (2.18) (1.56) (9.89) (6.45) (5.91) 
High Bog  -0.134  -0.065  -0.304  
  (-0.62)  (-0.11)  (-1.00)  
Ex_comp X High Bog  0.543*  0.246  0.738**  
  (1.87)  (0.18)  (1.98)  
High Fog       -0.608** 
       (-2.00) 
Ex_comp X High Fog       1.513*** 
       (4.14) 
Ln(Tenure) 0.304** 0.302** 0.347 0.342 0.319** 0.323** 0.311** 
 (2.41) (2.39) (1.00) (0.98) (2.42) (2.43) (2.44) 
IVOL 0.278 0.274 0.443 0.447 0.233 0.229 0.236 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.05) (1.06) (1.41) (1.38) (1.40) 
Neg_RET 0.638*** 0.620*** 0.430 0.416 0.747*** 0.722*** 0.677** 
 (2.67) (2.60) (0.83) (0.84) (2.79) (2.71) (2.54) 
RET -0.013** -0.014** -0.004 -0.004 -0.015** -0.016** -0.018*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.36) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-2.28) (-2.44) (-2.65) 
Neg_RET X RET 0.013 0.014 -0.013 -0.014 0.019* 0.020* 0.022** 
 (1.51) (1.51) (-0.77) (-0.82) (1.89) (1.95) (2.13) 
Loss -0.685* -0.734* -1.097 -1.106 -0.643 -0.719 -0.744 
 (-1.65) (-1.67) (-1.12) (-1.14) (-1.38) (-1.42) (-1.55) 
ROA -5.730** -5.635** -12.206** -12.181** -4.546 -4.421 -4.802 
 (-2.06) (-2.00) (-2.18) (-2.16) (-1.55) (-1.48) (-1.58) 
Loss X ROA 8.733 7.846 20.971 19.985 6.199 4.914 6.727 
 (1.58) (1.50) (0.83) (0.85) (0.93) (0.72) (1.00) 
EDec 0.446*** 0.434** -0.086 -0.094 0.545*** 0.530*** 0.531*** 
 (2.58) (2.52) (-0.22) (-0.24) (2.72) (2.66) (2.62) 
dROA 6.549** 6.477* 13.880*** 13.836*** 3.677 3.654 4.574 
 (1.98) (1.94) (2.66) (2.65) (1.06) (1.04) (1.23) 
EDec X ROA -7.499* -7.574* -18.61*** -18.52*** -3.583 -3.837 -4.031 
 (-1.74) (-1.75) (-2.88) (-2.89) (-0.76) (-0.81) (-0.79) 
Ln(Sales) 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.379*** 0.380*** 0.179** 0.182** 0.176** 
 (3.13) (3.17) (3.03) (3.04) (2.14) (2.18) (2.14) 
Constant -20.58*** -22.54*** -23.45*** -22.19*** -21.70*** -21.09*** -20.76*** 
 (-15.42) (-14.97) (-8.97) (-8.59) (-14.18) (-13.92) (-13.99) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.237 0.239 0.169 0.170 0.218 0.222 0.233 
Observations 2,686 2,686 1,160 1,160 1,526 1,526 1,526 
        
59 
 
Marginal effect of Excess comp 
Average ME 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.037** 0.037** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 
   High Bog/Fog = 0  0.114***  0.036  0.160*** 0.124*** 
   High Bog/Fog = 1  0.146***  0.038  0.223*** 0.252*** 
        
This table presents results for the determinants of high SOP dissent for our full sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 
firm-years between 2010 and 2014, using a logistic regression framework. The dependent variable, Dissent, is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if greater than 30% of SOP votes are cast ‘against’ proposed executive pay, and 
0 otherwise. We also present results for the underpay/overpay sub-samples separately, defined as observations 
with negative/positive values of Excess comp, respectively. The independent variables are defined in Appendix 
A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 industry classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based 
on a two-tailed test.  
We also present the average marginal effect of Excess comp over all observations in each regression, as well 


























Ownership structure and determinants of high SOP dissent 
Dependent variable: Dissent (1 if greater than 30% votes cast ‘against’) 
 Full sample Overpay sample 
 High IO Low IO High IO Low IO High IO Low IO 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Excess comp 2.203*** 1.843*** 2.422*** 2.042*** 1.891*** 1.731** 
 (5.86) (4.08) (5.31) (3.00) (4.98) (2.12) 
High Bog 0.501 -0.460 0.819* -1.584**   
 (1.31) (-1.22) (1.70) (-2.20)   
Excess comp X High Bog 0.345 0.830 0.079 2.305**   
 (0.71) (1.17) (0.13) (1.96)   
High Fog     0.152 -1.931*** 
     (0.29) (-2.94) 
Excess comp X High Fog     1.143** 2.691** 
     (1.97) (2.40) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.319 0.273 0.426 0.282 0.433 
Observations 1,070 1,071 660 549 660 549 
       
This table presents sub-sample logistic regression results for the determinants of high SOP dissent, for 2,141 
S&P 1500 firm-years between 2010 and 2014 where ownership data is obtained. We also present results based 
only on the overpay sample (observations with positive values for Excess comp). We present results for firm-
years with High IO and Low IO (Institutional Ownership), separately, defined as above and below median values 
of %Inst, respectively. %Inst is the proportion of shares outstanding held by 13-F institutional investors (source: 
Thomson One Banker). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The regressions also include the same 
set of controls as in Table 4, but we do not report the coefficients or the intercept in order to focus on the main 
variables of interest. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 industry 
classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based 













Comparison between propensity-score matched groups 
 Bog/Fog = Q4 Bog/Fog ≤ Q2 Analysis of differences 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median SMD t-stat Wilcoxon 
Panel A: Bog Index 
Dissent 0.145 0.096 0.000 0.000 15.15 2.16** 2.18** 
SOP Dissent (%) 12.570 11.121 4.865 5.547 10.07 1.44 0.37 
Excess comp 0.480 0.483 0.385 0.385 -0.85 -0.12 0.03 
Ln(Tenure) 1.984 1.929 2.048 2.015 7.60 1.08 0.49 
IVOL 1.425 1.363 1.264 1.234 9.23 1.32 1.77* 
Neg_RET 0.291 0.337 0.000 0.000 -10.08 -1.44 -1.45 
RET 12.338 11.626 13.280 8.908 2.65 0.38 0.90 
Loss 0.032 0.054 0.000 0.000 -10.92 -1.56 -1.57 
ROA 0.090 0.095 0.080 0.071 -5.00 -0.71 -0.08 
EDec 0.436 0.426 0.000 0.000 1.99 0.28 0.29 
dROA 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.92 -0.13 -0.76 
Ln(Sales) 14.694 14.522 14.548 14.341 11.44 1.63 1.75* 
Panel B: Fog Index 
Dissent 0.161 0.093 0.000 0.000 20.33 2.77*** 1.42 
SOP Dissent (%) 13.266 10.283 5.575 4.164 20.12 2.76*** 1.97** 
Excess comp 0.477 0.473 0.396 0.386 1.11 0.15 -1.16 
Ln(Tenure) 2.019 2.001 2.079 2.069 2.60 0.36 -0.29 
IVOL 1.490 1.337 1.308 1.239 25.80 3.53*** 1.97** 
Neg_RET 0.283 0.345 0.000 0.000 -13.42 -1.88* -1.62 
RET 12.249 11.698 12.014 7.993 2.05 0.29 0.82 
Loss 0.035 0.050 0.000 0.000 -7.53 -1.07 -1.26 
ROA 0.098 0.097 0.082 0.072 1.04 0.15 0.27 
EDec 0.490 0.438 0.000 0.000 10.42 1.45 0.06 
dROA 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.52 0.07 0.33 
Ln(Sales) 14.627 14.613 14.412 14.510 0.97 0.14 1.65* 
        
This table presents an analysis of differences between observations with top quartile values of our 
readability measures (Bog Index and Fog Index) and a propensity-score matched control group of firms with 
below median values (Bog/Fog ≤ Q2). In Panel A, we present estimates following matching based on Bog 
Index values of the CD&A, while in Panel B we present estimates following matching on the Fog Index. 
We perform analyses of differences using Standardised Mean Differences (SMD), two-sample t-tests, and 
nonparametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests. Results from these tests are presented in the last three 
columns. Standardised mean differences (SMD) are calculated as the difference in means between treatment 
and control groups, divided by the common standard deviation. Cohen (1969) suggests a minimum SMD value 
of 20 before acknowledging the existence of an economically small difference. For Wilcoxon and t-test results, 








Results using the propensity-score matched sample: Determinants of SOP dissent 
Dependent variable: Dissent (greater than 30% votes cast ‘against’) 
Independent variables Full matched sample High IO Low IO 
Panel A: Bog Index (1) (2) (3) 
Excess comp 1.380*** 1.296* 1.458 
 (2.80) (1.70) (1.07) 
High Bog Omitted Omitted Omitted 
    
Excess comp X High Bog 1.371** 1.743* 4.527* 
 (2.27) (1.77) (1.93) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.287 0.589 
Observations 812 429 287 
    
Panel B: Fog Index (4) (5) (6) 
Excess comp 0.535 1.198* 0.019 
 (1.23) (1.79) (0.01) 
High Fog Omitted Omitted Omitted 
    
Excess comp X High Fog 2.287*** 1.831** 6.512*** 
 (3.88) (2.08) (3.09) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.353 0.582 
Observations 814 431 282 
    
This table presents conditional logistic regression results for the determinants of high SOP dissent, following 
a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure. PSM is conducted for the overpay sample specifically, therefore 
the full matched sample contains only overpay observations. Results following matching based on Bog Index 
(Fog Index) are presented in Panel A (Panel B). Results are presented for the full propensity-score matched 
samples, as well as sub-samples based on High versus Low IO (institutional ownership). High (low) IO comprise 
firm-years with above (below) median values of %Inst. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and 
French’s 12 industry classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors. *, 

















Regression on the proportion of shares voted 
Dependent variable: SOP Participation (Proportion of shares voted) 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
%Inst (Institutional ownership) 0.337*** 0.339*** 
 (5.26) (5.38) 
Excess comp 0.970 2.719 
 (0.87) (1.08) 
High Bog 0.092  
 (0.24)  
Excess comp X High Bog 0.430  
 (0.53)  
High Fog  -1.631 
  (-1.23) 
Excess comp X High Fog  -2.978 
  (-1.19) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
R2 0.08 0.08 
Observations 2,023 2,023 
   
This table reports estimates from a cross-sectional OLS regression of the proportion of total shares 
outstanding voted either ‘for’ or ‘against’ in each issuers’ SOP, for 2,024 S&P 1500 firm-years between 2010 
and 2014 where ownership data is obtained, and where a one-share one-vote system is used. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 
industry classification. 
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 




The role of negative media coverage 
Independent variables Full sample Overpay sample 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Neg_Cov (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Excess comp 0.497 0.619 1.139** 1.117** 
 (1.05) (1.40) (1.97) (1.97) 
High Bog 0.096  0.259  
 (0.44)  (0.55)  
Excess comp X High Bog 0.088  -0.412  
 (0.17)  (-0.60)  
High Fog  -0.152  -0.107 
  (-0.64)  (-0.22) 
Excess comp X High Fog  -0.143  -0.349 
  (-0.29)  (-0.46) 
Ln(Sales) 0.744*** 0.743*** 0.741*** 0.749*** 
 (6.92) (6.83) (5.79) (5.83) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.155 0.194 0.196 
Observations 2,686 2,686 1,526 1,526 
     
Panel B: Dependent variable = Dissent (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Neg_cov -0.617 -0.880 -0.159 -0.704 
 (-0.83) (-1.18) (-0.18) (-0.85) 
Excess comp 1.835*** 1.601*** 1.813*** 1.337*** 
 (7.47) (7.39) (5.47) (4.50) 
Excess comp X Neg_cov 1.120 1.494 0.658 1.371 
 (1.22) (1.58) (0.71) (1.46) 
High Bog -0.184  -0.314  
 (-0.82)  (-0.99)  
Excess comp X High Bog 0.648**  0.803**  
 (2.09)  (1.98)  
High Bog X Neg_cov 1.005  -0.228  
 (1.01)  (-0.19)  
Excess comp X High Bog X Neg_cov -1.578  -0.462  
 (-1.22)  (-0.35)  
High Fog  -0.207  -0.697** 
  (-0.94)  (-2.20) 
Excess comp X High Fog  1.060***  1.708*** 
  (3.41)  (4.24) 
High Fog X Neg_cov  1.578  0.890 
  (1.61)  (0.68) 
Excess comp X High Fog X Neg_cov   -2.258*  -1.871 
  (-1.78)  (-1.31) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.240 0.247 0.222 0.234 
Observations 2,686 2,686 1,526 1,526 
     
This table presents results on the role of negative media coverage for our full sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 
firm-years between 2010 and 2014. We also present results based only on the overpay sample (observations 
with positive values for Excess comp). Panel A presents results from logistic regressions where the dependent 
variable is Neg_Cov, an indicator variable equal to 1 for observations where at least one negative article is 
published between the dates of the CD&A and the AGM, and 0 otherwise. Panel B presents results from logistic 
regressions where the dependent variable is Dissent, but we include Neg_Cov and interactions between Excess 
comp, High Bog (High Fog) and Neg_Cov as additional independent variables. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 industry 
classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors. *, 


























Robustness: Sensitivity to length of notice and volume of competing AGMs 
Dependent variable: Dissent (greater than 30% votes cast ‘against’) 
 Short notice = 1 Short notice = 0 Busy = 1 Busy = 0 
Panel A: Regressions employing Bog Index 
Excess comp 1.897*** 1.935*** 2.567*** 1.354*** 
 (3.80) (4.67) (4.56) (3.53) 
High Bog 0.161 -0.893** 0.111 -0.849* 
 (0.32) (-2.11) (0.23) (-1.85) 
Excess comp X High Bog 0.749 1.047* 0.220 1.299** 
 (1.11) (1.85) (0.32) (2.46) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.255 0.242 0.254 
Observations 596 930 831 695 
     
Panel B: Regressions employing Fog Index 
Excess comp 1.774*** 1.448*** 1.993*** 1.008** 
 (4.19) (3.50) (4.98) (2.53) 
High Fog -0.071 -1.046** -0.035 -1.143** 
 (-0.13) (-2.54) (-0.08) (-2.56) 
Excess comp X High Fog 1.156* 1.892*** 1.240** 1.949*** 
 (1.70) (3.65) (2.04) (3.71) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.265 0.257 0.264 
Observations 596 930 831 695 
     
This table presents sub-sample logistic regression results for the determinants of high SOP dissent for our 
overpay sample of 1,526 S&P 1500 firm-year observations between 2010 and 2014. Specifically, we split the 
sample by the dichotomous variables Short Notice and Busy, where; Short Notice takes the value 1 when the 
number of days between publication of the CD&A and the AGM is below median, and 0 otherwise; and, Busy 
takes the value 1 if the number of AGMs of S&P 1500 firms occurring on the same day is above median, and 0 
otherwise. We present results employing the Big Index (Fog Index) readability measure in Panel A (Panel B).  
All variables are defined in Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and 
French’s 12 industry classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors. *, 







Determinants of high SOP dissent – continuous measures 
Dependent variable: SOP Dissent (%) 
 Full sample Overpay sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Excess comp 8.773*** 8.682*** 15.977*** 15.850*** 
 (11.99) (12.26) (12.11) (12.07) 
Bog Index 0.011  -0.019  
 (0.44)  (-0.40)  
Excess comp X Bog Index 0.128**  0.133  
 (2.36)  (1.24)  
Fog Index  0.151  -0.270 
  (1.07)  (-0.97) 
Excess comp X Fog Index  0.877**  1.345** 
  (2.54)  (1.99) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.26 
Observations 2,686 2,686 1,526 1,526 
     
Marginal effect of Excess comp 
   Bog/Fog at 25th percentile 7.823*** 7.559*** 14.992*** 14.127*** 
   Bog/Fog at 50th percentile 8.719*** 8.545*** 15.922*** 15.639*** 
   Bog/Fog at 75th percentile  9.487*** 9.687*** 16.718*** 17.390*** 
     
This table presents results for the determinants of high SOP dissent for our full sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 
firm-years between 2010 and 2014, using an OLS regression framework. We also present results based only on 
the overpay sample (observations with positive values for Excess comp). The dependent variable, SOP Dissent 
(%), is the untransformed proportion of shares voted ‘against’ proposed executive pay. Bog Index and Fog Index 
are the continuous readability measures, centred to have a mean of zero. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 industry 
classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based 
on a two-tailed test. 
We also present the marginal effect of Excess comp when Bog Index/Fog Index are at their 25th, 50th, and 










Interacting readability measures with poor performance 
Dependent variable: Dissent (1 if greater than 30% votes cast ‘against’) 
 Full sample Overpay sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Excess comp 1.413*** 1.389*** 1.412*** 1.222*** 
 (5.26) (5.82) (4.18) (4.09) 
High Bog 0.122  -0.079  
 (0.40)  (-0.19)  
Excess comp X High Bog 0.607**  0.881**  
 (2.01)  (2.28)  
High Fog  0.126  -0.540 
  (0.40)  (-1.29) 
Excess comp X High Fog  0.798***  1.500*** 
  0.126  -0.540 
Neg_RET 0.795*** 0.846*** 1.106*** 1.051*** 
 (2.58) (2.67) (2.65) (2.62) 
Loss -0.370 -0.987 -0.718 -0.932 
 (-0.54) (-1.24) (-0.59) (-0.79) 
EDec 0.111 0.147 -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.43) (0.54) (-0.05) (-0.02) 
Excess comp X Neg_RET 0.026 -0.056 -0.392 -0.580 
 (0.07) (-0.16) (-0.84) (-1.20) 
Excess comp X Loss 0.436 -0.073 1.271 0.510 
 (0.49) (-0.11) (1.08) (0.48) 
Excess comp X EDec 0.952*** 0.848*** 1.097*** 0.934** 
 (3.03) (2.73) (2.72) (2.33) 
High Bog X Neg_RET -0.318  -0.255  
 (-0.94)  (-0.67)  
High Bog X Loss -1.562  -2.431***  
 (-1.56)  (-2.78)  
High Bog X EDec -0.170  -0.204  
 (-0.52)  (-0.57)  
High Fog X Neg_RET  -0.421  -0.118 
  (-1.23)  (-0.30) 
High Fog X Loss  0.364  -0.511 
  (0.37)  (-0.49) 
High Fog X EDec  -0.112  0.008 
  (-0.35)  (0.02) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.250 0.235 0.239 
Observations 2,686 2,686 1,526 1,526 
This table presents results for the determinants of high SOP dissent for our full sample of 2,686 S&P 1500 
firm-years between 2010 and 2014, using a logistic regression framework. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. We include fixed effects for year and industry following Fama and French’s 12 industry classification.  
T-statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based 
on a two-tailed test. 
 
